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KEEPING THE FLIES OUT OF THE 
OINTMENT: RESTRICTING OBJECTORS TO 
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 
BRUCE D. GREENBERG† 
It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how 
the strong man stumbled, or where the doers of deed could have 
done better.  The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the 
arena: whose face is marred by the dust and sweat and blood; 
who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and 
again . . . who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, 
and spends himself in a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows in 
the end the triumph of high achievement; and who, at the worst 
if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place 
shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither 
victory nor defeat.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Most class actions are resolved by settlement.  By rule, class 
action settlements must be approved by the court.2  When the 
parties to a class action and their respective counsel agree to 
settle the case, they join forces in presenting their settlement to 
the court and seeking approval of that settlement. 
The settlement is agreed to, however, without direct 
involvement by members of the class that will be bound by the  
 
 
† Bruce D. Greenberg, B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1979, J.D., Columbia 
University School of Law, 1982, is a member of the law firm of Lite DePalma 
Greenberg, LLC, Newark, New Jersey. He regularly handles class action matters, 
most often on behalf of plaintiffs but sometimes on behalf of defendants. As a matter 
of full disclosure, he in one instance represented, successfully, an objector to a class 
action settlement. The author thanks his partners Allyn Z. Lite and Katrina Carroll, 
and his former colleague, Vermont Law School Lawyer Librarian Julie Graves 
Krishnaswami, for their input and insights on the subject of this Article. 
1 Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961 (E.D. Tex. 2000) 
(quoting Theodore Roosevelt). 
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). Many state court class action rules are largely similar in 
this and other respects discussed in this Article and will not be separately discussed 
or cited. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 4:32-2(e)(1)(A) (2010).  
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settlement.  As a result, such “absent class members” are 
permitted to object that a proposed settlement is not fair, 
reasonable, and adequate.3 
In theory, objectors can occasionally highlight aspects of a 
proposed settlement that are unreasonable or that expose 
conflicts among the interests of class members or between class 
counsel and the class.4  But in reality, all too frequently, objectors 
and their counsel see an opportunity to extract money from the 
parties or class counsel, whose efforts brought about the 
settlement, by threatening to upset or seriously detour the 
settlement.  Objectors make arguments that are groundless yet 
sufficient to delay the settlement approval process for months or 
years unless class counsel or the parties agree to “buy off” the 
objector or the objector’s counsel.  Objector tactics can prove 
lucrative because the other parties may prefer to “buy off” the 
objectors rather than suffer the delay and additional expense 
necessary to defeat the objection. 
Courts have been somewhat schizophrenic about objectors.  
A few cases have recognized that objectors can sometimes inform 
the court of problems with a proposed settlement that the 
parties, no longer adversaries, would not perceive or raise.5  Far 
more courts, however, have noted that many objections are 
groundless and filed for purposes of extracting unwarranted 
payments.6  Such objections are most often filed by “professional 





3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5). The right of absent class members to object to a 
settlement is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985). Absent class members in cases certifying 
classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) also have the right to exclude 
themselves from the settlement. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (stating that there is 
an absolute right to opt out of settlement where the class is certified in connection 
with settlement); id. 23(e)(4) (stating that the court may afford a new opportunity to 
opt out if the class was certified prior to settlement). Such exclusion is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Sometimes, in multiple defendant cases, nonsettling defendants 
object to settlements, often, though not always, based on “bar orders” that limit their 
right to shift responsibility to the settling defendant. See, e.g., In re Heritage Bond 
Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 676 (9th Cir. 2008). Such objections are also beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
4 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.643 (2004). 
5 See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 55–64 and accompanying text. 
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action settlements and extracting a part of class counsel’s hard-
earned attorney fees or a payment from the settling parties for 
compromising those objections.7   
In at least two ways, professional objectors harm the class 
members whose interests they claim to represent.  First, 
professional objectors’ almost invariably groundless objections 
delay the provision of relief to class members who, in most 
instances, have already waited years for resolution.  Second, by 
feeding off the fees earned by class counsel who took the risk of 
suing defendants on a purely contingent basis, as is the normal 
practice in class actions, professional objectors create a 
disincentive for class counsel to take on such risky matters.  That 
disincentive clashes with the public interest, repeatedly 
recognized by courts, to incentivize class counsel to handle such 
cases. 
This Article proposes changes in the way courts evaluate 
objections and the persons who bring them.  It also suggests a 
return to fundamental principles of the law governing attorney 
fees for objector counsel.  Restricting objector counsel fees would 
reduce their incentive to file groundless objections, by limiting 
fee awards to only those who raise valid problems with a 
settlement that the courts would not otherwise perceive.  
Reducing the ability of objectors, particularly professional 
objectors, to obtain a fee will concomitantly lessen the frequency 
of their objections, thus benefiting class members by reducing 
delays in the implementation of appropriate settlements. 
Part I shows that objectors, especially professional objectors, 
are frequently not needed, particularly in the high-dollar cases 
where they normally surface, since existing multi-layered 
protections ensure the fairness of settlements. The protections 
include the class counsel’s fiduciary duty to the class, the class 
counsel’s own economic interest in advocating only appropriate 
settlements, the obligation of judges to scrutinize settlements for 
 
7 See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or 
Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 437 & n.150 (defining “professional 
objectors” as “attorneys who make a living free riding off the work of class counsel” 
by “filing objections in class action cases, usually after a proposed settlement has 
emerged, and always to collect a fee”). Professor Brunet found insufficient evidence 
at that time to determine whether professional objectors existed. See id. at 437–39. 
As this Article will demonstrate, however, cases since that time show conclusively 
the existence of professional objectors and their increasing unjustifiable interference 
with major proposed class action settlements.  
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fairness and the class counsel’s requested fees for 
reasonableness, judges’ track record of carefully evaluating 
settlements even before objectors come on the scene, and, in 
many cases, the role of governmental agencies who must be 
notified of proposed settlements and can protect class members’ 
interests.  Only in the relatively rare case in which an objector 
raises a valid problem with a settlement that a court would not 
otherwise have perceived does an objection have value, and 
professional objectors virtually never do that. 
Instead, as Part II shows, professional objectors often fail to 
make the effort necessary to understand the settlement that they 
are attacking, as courts have frequently noted.  Instead, 
professional objectors simply present the same “canned” 
objections again and again, often copying them verbatim from 
case to case regardless of their appropriateness.  Part II 
identifies some of these boilerplate arguments made by objectors 
of all types and suggests that courts treat such objections, and 
any objections by professional objectors, either as presumptively 
invalid or incapable of supporting an objector counsel’s request 
for fees. 
Finally, Part III reviews the law applicable to objector fee 
requests.  The general rule has been that objectors can only 
rarely win a fee award for objecting, but some courts recently 
have been more receptive to fee awards for objector counsel.  
Since professional objectors have perceived that it has become 
easier to obtain a fee, they have been emboldened to file 
objections in any case of significant size.  That result disserves 
class members by: (1) delaying implementation of settlements; 
and (2) disincentivizing class counsel, who end up having to 
share their fees with professional objectors who did nothing to 
create the value from which the fees result.  Courts should return 
to the rule that objector fees are only rarely available and then 
only where objector counsel substantially benefit the class.   
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF THE CLASS ACTION 
SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
Class actions are risky and complex.8  In recognition of that 
fact, courts often state that there is no precise settlement amount 
 
8 See, e.g., In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Jones v. Dominion 
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that is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  Rather, there is normally 
a “range of reasonableness,” at any point within which 
settlement negotiators might properly agree.9  Yet objections 
frequently focus on ways in which a proposed settlement falls 
short of an optimal one for the class, without regard to the 
plaintiffs’ likelihood of ultimate success at trial or whether the 
settlement as agreed is nonetheless within the range of 
reasonableness.10  In doing so, objectors allege that a lack of 
adversarialness by the representative plaintiffs and their counsel 
result in a disservice to the class.   
A. The Structural Protections Afforded to Class Members by the 
Settlement Process 
When the parties to a class action join hands and present a 
proposed settlement to a court, the adversarial process, which is 
 
Res. Servs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 756, 762 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (stating that class 
counsel “risk defeat at several stages of litigation: class certification, dispositive 
motions, and finally, trial”). 
9 Courts have long listed “the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in 
light of the best possible recovery” among the factors to be considered in evaluating a 
proposed settlement. See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(citation omitted); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(citation omitted). Many cases have recognized that this range can encompass even 
settlements for only a few cents on the dollar, sometimes depending on the strength 
or weakness of the plaintiffs’ case. See, e.g., Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 455 & n.2 
(finding that a settlement of even a few cents on the dollar can be reasonable); 
Silberblatt v. Morgan Stanley, 524 F. Supp. 2d 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding 
that a settlement payment of 37.5% of all sums allegedly improperly paid to 
defendants was “a very good settlement”); In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 
2d 491, 510 n.4 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that settlement for between five percent 
and twenty-five percent of maximum provable damages was reasonable because in 
other cases, settlements for even lower percentages of maximum damages had been 
approved). 
10 See, e.g., Browning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C04-01463 HRL, 2007 WL 4105971, at 
*8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007) (“The few objections that purport to consider the 
viability of Plaintiff’s claim either do so in a conclusory manner, or paint an 
unreasonably rosy picture of the prospects of success for this class.”); Snell v. Allianz 
Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640, at *19 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 
2000); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 304 (N.D. Ga. 
1993) (“[I]t is unrealistic to expect a recovery that is the equivalent of a victory by 
plaintiffs at trial.”); In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 720 F. Supp. 
1379, 1394 (D. Ariz. 1989) (observing that objections were based on the “fallacious” 
assumption that “the case assured certain victory for Plaintiffs”). As the Seventh 
Circuit has stated, a “settlement will not be rejected solely because it does not 
provide a complete victory to the plaintiffs.” Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1200 (7th 
Cir. 1996).  
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often said to yield the most appropriate results,11 is no longer 
fully operational.12  That can be true both as to the substantive 
terms of the settlement and as to the fees to be paid to class 
counsel.13  Despite that, however, there are several significant 
structural guarantees that lead the parties and their counsel to 
settle only on appropriate terms. 
First, class counsel have fiduciary duties that run not only to 
the named plaintiffs but to absent class members as well.14  To 
comply with those duties, class counsel will not settle a case 
except after considering the discovery taken, the applicable facts 
and law, and the likelihood of success.15  For this reason, many 
cases state that the judgment of experienced class counsel, who 
are familiar with the facts and law of the case, is to be given 
substantial weight in determining whether to approve a 
settlement.16   
 
11 See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[O]ur legal tradition 
regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and 
minimizing the risk of error . . . .”); In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 310 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“The adversary process plays an indispensable role in our system of 
justice . . . .”). 
12 See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 
55 F.3d 768, 789 (3d Cir. 1995). 
13 The parties sometimes negotiate a “clear sailing” agreement as to fees, under 
which the defendant will pay class counsel attorney fees, as awarded by the court, of 
up to a certain amount without objection. Courts have differed in their views of such 
agreements, though they in fact pose no problem in the context of an arms-length 
negotiation. Compare Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 525 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (“[T]he inclusion of a clear sailing clause in a fee application should put a 
court on its guard . . . .”), with In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 
148 F.3d 283, 334–35 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding a clear sailing agreement negotiated 
only after agreement was reached on settlement for class was not improper); see also 
Waters v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1293 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(citing cases on both sides of this issue). The Advisory Committee note to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) states that “[t]he agreement by a settling party not to 
oppose a fee application up to a certain amount, for example, is worthy of 
consideration, but the court remains responsible to determine a reasonable fee.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s note.  
14 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002); 
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001). 
15 These same factors are among those that guide courts’ analyses of whether a 
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. West Publ’g 
Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 963–67 (9th Cir. 2009); Int’l Union v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 
F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007); Isby, 75 F.3d at 1198–99; Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 
153, 156–57 (3d Cir. 1975); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d 
Cir. 1974). 
16 See, e.g., Isby, 75 F.3d at 1200; DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 292 
(W.D. Tex. 2007); Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
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Courts have ample reason to be confident in the judgment of 
class counsel.  For example, in securities fraud cases, class 
counsel are no longer selected by the first plaintiff to file a 
lawsuit.  Instead, class counsel are proposed by the court-
appointed lead plaintiff, who is selected after a rigorous and often 
competitive process under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”), and must be approved by the court.17  
Even in nonsecurities matters, the court must appoint class 
counsel and ensure the adequacy of those counsel when it 
certifies a class.18  Rule 23(g)(1)(A) lists a number of criteria that 
the court must follow in making that appointment,19 designed to 
screen out unqualified or untrustworthy counsel.  These criteria 
justify reliance on class counsel when they advocate a settlement. 
Additionally, class counsel have a financial incentive to seek 
adequate settlements.  When considering a class settlement, 
particularly in cases where a litigation class has not already been 
certified, courts are required to find that all the requirements for 
class certification, including adequacy of representation under 
Rule 23(a)(4), are satisfied.20  Class counsel who recommend an 
inadequate settlement will not be found adequate, and the entire 
proposed settlement, as well as class counsel’s own fee, will thus 
be jeopardized.21  This gives class counsel a financial incentive, 
beyond their fiduciary duty, itself a significant motivator,22 to 
offer only appropriate settlements for approval. 
 
17 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2006) (stating that lead plaintiff selects class 
counsel, but subject to court approval).  
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A)–(B). 
19 Id. 23(g)(1)(A). 
20 See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 
307–08 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)). 
21 See, e.g., In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 305–08 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(expressing discomfort with adequacy of class counsel and vacating settlement based 
on failure to satisfy Rule 23 criteria). 
22 A finding in one case that class counsel is inadequate affects that counsel not 
only in that matter, but in subsequent cases where that same counsel seeks 
appointment as class counsel. Courts will be disinclined to appoint as class counsel 
attorneys who have been found inadequate elsewhere. Competitors for appointment 
as class counsel in such subsequent cases will be quick to highlight such findings of 
inadequacy. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 397 
(2000) (noting “open warfare over which counsel is to be chosen lead counsel”); 
Nowak v. Ford Motor Co., 240 F.R.D. 355, 358 n.4, 365–66 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(competitors for lead counsel position hurled charges of failing to meet deadlines or 
to observe court rules, filing “copycat” pleadings, and alleged conflicts of interest); In 
re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (describing “volleys of 
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956 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:949   
Second, as a backstop to class counsel, the judge who reviews 
a proposed settlement is charged with acting as a fiduciary who 
must protect the rights of absent class members.23  Many cases 
hold that judges are not simply to rubber-stamp settlements but 
are instead to review them scrupulously.24   
There is a two-step process for evaluating settlements.  First, 
the judge determines whether a proposed settlement is sufficient 
enough to justify notice to the class and full consideration of the 
settlement at a final hearing.25  Though this preliminary review 
is deferential,26 and occurs before class members are even made 
aware of the proposed settlement so that no objectors are yet 
present, judges have rejected a number of proposed settlements 
at that stage.27  Second, at the final hearing, the judge considers 
 
disparagement” launched by counsel competing for lead role). This cascading effect 
of a determination of inadequacy that could result from recommending an unfair 
settlement is a powerful check on any class counsel who might be considering 
“selling out” a class in settlement. 
23 See, e.g., Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-
Medco Managed Care, LLC, 504 F.3d 229, 249 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Bank Am. Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 350 F.3d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 2003); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 
F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing cases); In re Gen. Motors Pick-Up Truck 
Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 805 (3d Cir. 1995). 
24 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 82 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Zoran 
Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C 06-05503 WHA, 2008 WL 941897, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
7, 2008). This is particularly so when no litigation class has been certified, so that 
the parties are seeking settlement approval and approval of a settlement class 
simultaneously. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 805 (stating that “courts 
[must] . . . be even more scrupulous than usual” in such a context); Mars Steel Corp. 
v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 1987). 
25 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th 
Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds, Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 
1998); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 562 
(D.N.J. 1997) (citation omitted), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Motor Fuel 
Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 258 F.R.D. 671, 675–76 (D. Kan. 2009); MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4, § 13.14.   
26 See, e.g., In re NASDAQ Mkt. Makers Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp. 174, 177 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (preliminary approval required if no “obvious deficiencies” in 
proposed settlement); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 6:03-MD-1512, 
2005 WL 1875545, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 30, 2005) (characterizing preliminary 
approval review as a “cursory examination”).  
27 See, e.g., Keene v. Coldwater Creek, Inc., No. C 07-05324 WHA, 2009 WL 
1833992, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2009) (noting denial of two prior applications for 
preliminary settlement approval); Scott v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., Civil No. 06-cv-
286-JD, 2008 WL 2563460, at *1, *3 (D.N.H. June 24, 2008) (noting repeated denials 
of motions for preliminary settlement approval); In re Zoran, 2008 WL 941897, at *2; 
In re Chiron Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-04-4293 VRW, 2007 WL 4249902, at *17–18 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2007); Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 
1299 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting denial of prior motion for preliminary settlement 
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the arguments of both the parties and any objectors and 
conscientiously determines whether the proposed settlement is 
fair, reasonable, and adequate.28  
The court’s oversight duty is stronger still when concerning 
attorney fee awards to class counsel.  In 2005, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure were amended to add Rule 23(h).  The 
Advisory Committee note to that new rule states that “[a]ctive 
judicial involvement in measuring fee awards is singularly 
important to the proper operation of the class-action process.”29  
A number of cases have quoted that note in evaluating fee 
awards.30  The Advisory Committee emphasized that “[e]ven in 
the absence of objections, the court bears this responsibility.”31 
These structural protections for class members—two sets of 
fiduciaries who have multiple motivations to prevent inadequate 
settlements—are very robust.  They virtually always ensure that 
unfair or unreasonable settlements do not receive final 
approval.32  As a result, objectors are rarely necessary, since they 
normally do not tell judges anything that those judges do not 
 
approval); In re Gilat Satellite Networks, Ltd., No. CV-02-1510 (CPS) (SMG), 2007 
WL 2743675, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2007); Acosta v. Trans Union, LLC, 243 
F.R.D. 377, 379 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Woullard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 
1:06cv1057 LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 208519, at *4, *6 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 26, 2007); 
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (noting 
denial of two prior motions for preliminary settlement approval); Johnson v. GMAC 
Mortgage Group, Inc., No. 04-cv-2004–LRR, 2006 WL 1071748, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 
20, 2006); In re Elec. Data Sys., 2005 WL 1875545, at *6; Sutton v. Bernard, No. 00 
C 6676, 2002 WL 1794048, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2002); In re Microsoft Corp. 
Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525, 530 (D. Md. 2002); cf. Laroque v. Domino’s 
Pizza, LLC, 557 F. Supp. 2d 346, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting partial denial of 
preliminary approval of collective action certification under Fair Labor Standards 
Act).   
28 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4, § 21.634.  
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s note. 
30 See, e.g., In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 830, 857 (E.D. La. 2007); In re 
Cabletron Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 30, 38 (D.N.H. 2006). 
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s note. 
32 There are, of course, isolated and inevitable exceptions. See, e.g., In re Cmty. 
Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2005) (criticizing district judge for 
simply adopting findings and conclusions submitted by class counsel before having 
reviewed them and indicating that class counsel might not be adequate 
representatives of class). But in virtually every other case, class counsel and judges 
have discharged their duties faithfully, as the system expects, even where 
settlements have ultimately been found unacceptable. Rejection of a settlement does 
not necessarily mean that class counsel, or a trial level judge, has betrayed duties to 
the class.     
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already perceive.33  Moreover, in 2005, Congress enacted 
legislation that, among other things, directed that state 
attorneys general or federal authorities receive notice of many 
proposed settlements and have the opportunity to object to 
them.34  These agencies, who act in the public interest and do not 
seek to extort payments from the settling parties, likely serve 
whatever useful function objectors can perform in such cases.35  
B. The Fallacy That Objectors Seek To Protect the Class, as 
Opposed to the Personal Interests of the Objectors or Their 
Counsel 
The position that objectors are useful relies on the notion, 
more theoretical than real, that class counsel and district courts 
may fail to protect the class as required.36  Thus, class counsel 
 
33 See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 278 
n.32 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that the court “read with amusement” objector’s 
assertion that judge could not have read settlement papers and evaluated settlement 
on his own). This is particularly so of objectors to class counsel’s attorney fees 
requests. See infra notes 93–95, 101–02 and accompanying text. But it also applies 
to objectors who complain about the merits of the settlement. Professional objectors 
in particular often fail to read or understand the settlement to which they object. See 
infra notes 68, 137 and accompanying text. Pro se objectors often lack the expertise 
to understand all the components of and considerations underlying settlements 
despite the detailed notices that accompany them and the ability to telephone class 
counsel to get more information.   
34 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2006). These agencies are often underfunded and 
overburdened, leading to the need for “private attorneys general” such as class 
counsel to enforce the law. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 
445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The aggregation of individual claims in . . . a classwide 
suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of the government.”); cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & 
Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (noting the pressure brought by private 
attorneys general “on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial 
resources are deemed inadequate”). However, these regulatory authorities are more 
likely to respond to specific and detailed invitations to comment on or object to class 
action settlements. Indeed, that has happened in at least one case, which led to the 
rejection of a proposed settlement. Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 
1292, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2007).   
35 See Brunet, supra note 7, at 449–56 (describing activities and capabilities of 
state and federal government agencies in objecting to class action settlements). 
36 Much of the academic concern about the conduct of class counsel and the 
courts arose from celebrated mass tort litigation in the 1990s, especially asbestos 
class actions. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 629–30 (3d 
Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); 
Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 507–08 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (discussing a 
private firm that also handled asbestos cases and a legal clinic that was a subsidiary 
of a maritime law firm), aff’d sub nom. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 968 (5th 
Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999); 
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might allow their own financial interests in a fee that will result 
from any settlement, even an inadequate one, to override their 
duties to their clients, the class.37  Additionally, some judges may 
abandon their own duty and simply rubber-stamp what the 
settling parties present to dispose of a burdensome matter or to 
advance their own secret substantive agenda.38   
But actual experience shows that these cynical concerns 
about class counsel and the judiciary are virtually never realized.  
On the contrary, class counsel take on risky cases on an entirely 
contingent basis, against well-funded defendants represented by 
top-flight counsel.39  Class counsel advance vast sums in out-of-
pocket expenses and invest their time over periods of many 
years.40  Only if they succeed by trial or a settlement that must 
be approved by the court do they earn a fee.  Even that fee must 
likewise obtain judicial approval, after notice to the class and 
“beady-eyed scrutiny” by the court.41  Indeed, class counsel who 
betray their clients risk sanctions,42 malpractice actions,43 or even 
 
Coffee, supra note 22, at 372–74 (focusing on mass tort and non-opt out class actions 
while addressing broader issues); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow 
Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1047–49 
(1995) (attacking the ethics of class counsel in Georgine, by a paid expert witness on 
behalf of settlement objectors); Symposium, Mass Torts: Serving Up Just Desserts, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995). But the theoretical foundation was provided earlier 
by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. in a number of articles, some of which date back to 
the 1980s. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 22; John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The 
Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986). 
37 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002). 
38 See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts-Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
1228, 1233 (1995). For an apparent example of such rubber-stamping, see In re 
Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 300–01 (3d Cir. 2005). 
39 Courts often recognize that class actions are very risky and that class counsel 
must fight against excellent lawyers for defendants. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 357–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Lucent Tech., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d 426, 436–37 (D.N.J. 2004); In re Ikon Office Sys., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 194–95 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (discussing that securities fraud cases 
are difficult, and Private Securities Litigation Reform Act made them more so, and 
stating that defense counsel had “a fine reputation” and “displayed great skill”).  See 
also supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 70, 99 and accompanying text. 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), (h); Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 286 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating 
that fee requests are to receive “beady-eyed scrutiny”). 
42 The criminal proceedings brought against the Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes 
& Lerach firm and several of its top members, which resulted in guilty pleas and jail 
sentences for the members, are an extreme example of this. See, e.g., Michael 
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their licenses.  There is no reason to presume that class counsel 
would risk such consequences.  Judges, too, normally do their 
duty.44  In the usual case, therefore, there is little need for 
objectors to look over the shoulders of class counsel and the court.   
In reality, objectors and professional objector counsel often 




Parrish, Leading Class-Action Lawyer Is Sentenced to Two Years in Kickback 
Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at C3 (discussing sentencing of William Lerach 
for concealing illegal payments to the firm’s clients in class action cases).  
43 See generally Huber v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008) (legal malpractice 
action arising out of alleged breaches of duty to plaintiff clients by defendant 
attorneys); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 1051, 1057 (1996) (“In short, our answer to class action abuse is ‘sue the 
bastards.’ ”).   
44 See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 331 (1984) (expressing 
the belief that “judges faithfully honor their obligations to enforce applicable state 
and federal laws”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (refusing to 
assume that “judges will not be faithful to their constitutional responsibilities”). 
Some scholars have concluded, however, that relying on trial judges to scrutinize 
settlements is “sure to fail.” See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 22, at 438; Koniak & Cohen, 
supra note 43, at 1122–28. But if that were so, it would be expected that trial judges 
would virtually never deny preliminary settlement approval at a time when no 
objectors are yet present, and the parties should, according to critics of the judicial 
role, be able to have their way with allegedly pliable, uninformed, biased, lazy, or 
corrupt judges. That is particularly so since preliminary approval does little more 
than direct that notice of settlement—for which one or both settling parties pay—be 
given to the class and open a proposed settlement to more searching review at a final 
hearing. Thus, it should be very easy for a trial level judge to grant preliminary 
settlement approval, since the court incurs no cost by doing so and, if anything, 
advances its supposed overriding interest in facilitating settlements so as to clear its 
docket of a potentially burdensome matter. Yet, it is not difficult to find examples of 
courts denying preliminary settlement approval. See supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. The preliminary approval laboratory demonstrates the vitality of 
judicial review of proposed settlements, as do the not insignificant number of cases 
in which judges have awarded a reduced fee to class counsel even though there were 
no objections to the requested fees. See infra note 102. Such rulings go against the 
notion that judges’ need for approval from lawyers in the settled cases and others 
who might later appear before them leads judges to accept settlements and counsel 
fee applications uncritically. See, e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supra note 43, at 1127.        
45 See, e.g., Barnes v. Fleetboston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 71072, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (“Repeat objectors to class action 
settlements can make a living simply by filing frivolous appeals and thereby slowing 
down the execution of settlements.”); Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 
514 (D. Del. 2003) (stating that groundless objection by serial objector counsel 
“appears to be nothing more than an attempt to receive attorneys’ fees”). 
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sometimes wangle special consideration for themselves.46  But, 
more importantly, objector counsel can collect fees for filing 
objections, in at least two ways. 
First, objector counsel can negotiate for payment of a fee as 
part of their clients’ agreement to withdraw their objections, 
regardless of the merits of those objections.47  Such payments 
often bear no relationship whatsoever to the actual time 
expended by such counsel since, unlike class counsel who seek a 
fee award from a court,48 objector counsel frequently do not 
submit time records for judicial scrutiny or document their 
claimed fee in any other way.49  The amount of the fee paid to 
objector counsel in exchange for going away is purely a matter of 
negotiation, in which objectors can take full advantage of the 
leverage that the threat of delay alone poses to the settling 
parties.50   
 
 
46 See, e.g., Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate 
Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 618 (1997). 
47 See, e.g., Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
objectors may “intervene and cause expensive delay in the hope of getting paid to go 
away”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4 (“An objection, even of little 
merit, can be costly and significantly delay implementation of a class settlement.”).   
48 In general, there are two bases for a fee award to class counsel. The “lodestar 
method” is based on the number of hours reasonably billed, which class counsel must 
document for the court, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, subject to further 
adjustment, such as an enhancement by a multiplier. See infra text accompanying 
note 165. The “percentage of the fund” method awards class counsel a percentage of 
the settlement common fund or common benefit that counsel’s efforts helped to 
create. See generally Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(discussing lodestar and percentage methods). Even where a percentage award is 
made, courts often use the lodestar as a “cross-check.” See, e.g., In re AT&T Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 455 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) (recommending such a cross-check); 
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, though class 
counsel are not required to submit detailed time records to support a percentage 
award, see, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig. Agent Actions, 
148 F.3d 283, 342 (3d Cir. 1998), some evidence of their actual time expended is 
always before the court in order to enable the “lodestar cross-check.” 
49 See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., No. 01 C 722, 2007 WL 2608778, 
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2007), aff’d, 551 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub 
nom. Perry v. Mirfasihi, 129 S. Ct. 2767 (2009); Perez v. Asurion Corp., No. 06-
20734-CIV, 2007 WL 2591174, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. July 18, 2007); In re WorldCom, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288 (DLC), 2006 WL 1722573, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 
2006) (stating that objector counsel failed to submit time records to support demand 
for over $100,000 in fees even after court specifically requested such records); Spark, 
289 F. Supp. 2d at 514 n.5. 
50 See Barnes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3–4. 
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Second, objector counsel have been awarded fees for purely 
cosmetic “improvements” to a settlement, or for merely 
“sharpening the issues” for the court without having enhanced 
the settlement.51  In such instances, objector counsel demand 
either a portion of the additional value that the “improvement” to 
the settlement can be said to be worth or a large portion of the 
attorney fees that class counsel earned through years of risky 
litigation that resulted in the questioned settlement, while 
objector counsel sat on the sidelines or failed in their own 
litigation against the defendant.52  Particularly in cases in which 
a large fee may be in the offing for class counsel, settlements 
make an inviting target for rapacious professional objectors.53  
 
51 See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text. 
52 See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(objector’s counsel demanded a fee almost equal to the fee granted to class counsel); 
Mirfasihi, 2007 WL 2608778, at *7 n.5 (stating that objector’s counsel demanded one 
hundred percent of fee awarded to class counsel); New England Carpenters Health 
Benefits Fund v. First Databank, Inc., No. 05-11148-PBS, 2009 WL 3418628, at *1 
(D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2009) (stating that objector’s counsel demanded over $28,000 in 
fees for objecting to class counsel’s request for fee of $84,000,000); Parker v. Time 
Warner Entm’t Co., 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that objector 
demanded over $860,000 in fees, which was over twenty five percent of the fee award 
to successful class counsel); Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 
SBA, 2006 WL 4037549, at *2, *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (stating that objector 
counsel sought 12.5% of the class counsel fee and labeling that request “exorbitant”); 
Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, L.P. v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, L.L.P., 
212 F.R.D. 400, 416 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (stating that objector sought ten percent of the 
class counsel fee, which court found excessive); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust 
Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (rejecting one objector’s fee request as 
“exorbitant” and “excessive”). This happens with particular frequency in the context 
of objections to class counsel fees. If the court awards less than class counsel 
requested, objectors demand outlandish percentages of the reduction for themselves. 
See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2008) (court 
labeled “chutzpah” and “preposterous” objector counsel’s demand that entire fee 
awarded to class counsel be transferred to objectors); In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (court reduced class counsel fee 
request by $37 million; one objector sought eighteen percent of that amount, or $6.66 
million, while another demanded ten percent, amounting to $3.7 million); Spark, 289 
F. Supp. 2d at 513 (stating that objector sought 10.17% of fee reduction). 
53 See In re Cardinal Health, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (“[O]pportunistic 
objectors . . . now seem to accompany every major securities litigation.”); Azizian, 
2006 WL 4037549, at *9 (“The announcement of a large settlement in a class action 
involving widely used products, with $24,000,000 for attorneys’ fees and costs often 
attracts other lawyers who had nothing to do with the instigation of the case to see if 
they might make some changes in the settlement agreement; thereby, permitting 
them to participate in the award of attorneys’ fees and costs.”); Barnes, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3–4 (“Because of these economic realities, professional 
objectors can levy what is effectively a tax on class action settlements, a tax that has 
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Thus, perversely, professional objectors have purely monetary 
incentives to find even a quibble to raise in opposition to a 
settlement—even as class counsel and the court are bound to 
ensure that the settlement is within the range of 
reasonableness.54   
Many courts have perceived that objectors often file mere 
“generic, unhelpful protests.”55  Examples of professional objector 
counsel filing boilerplate papers, sometimes without even 
changing the names of parties from one case to the next, are 
 
no benefit to anyone other than the objectors.”). Perhaps for this reason, professional 
objector counsel seem to travel in packs, with the same counsel surfacing together in 
many of the same cases. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 
516, 520–21 (3d Cir. 2004); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 212 
(D.N.J. 2005); Azizian, 2006 WL 4037549, at *5 (illustrating that there are many of 
the same objector counsel on counsel lists in these cases and listing many of the 
most ubiquitous professional objectors). Since those professional objectors rarely, if 
ever, are found to have presented valid arguments, any alternative explanation that 
they all appear in the same cases because those settlements are inadequate is not 
sustainable. The selfish interest of professional objectors in extorting fees also 
explains why some scholarly analyses say that most class action settlements have no 
objectors. See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL 
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 178 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1996) 
(stating that between forty-two and sixty-four percent of settlements saw no 
objections); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and 
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 1529 (2004) (collecting data showing few or no objectors in many cases). Run-of-
the-mill, smaller settlements, whether reasonable or not, entail smaller fees to class 
counsel, rather than the fat fee target that professional objectors seek, so that 
professional objectors are not motivated to scrutinize those smaller settlements. 
54 Some objectors have seized on typos or other technical glitches in the 
settlement documents as a basis for objections, even though the settlement terms 
were otherwise clear, and, in any event, any confusion caused by the typos could 
have been resolved by contacting class counsel or a settlement administrator. See, 
e.g., DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 317 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Varacallo, 226 
F.R.D. at 227.  
55 Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 23 n.5 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 
Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 973 (E.D. Tex. 2000); see 
also Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (stating that 
objectors offered only “generic compilations of well-known case law and . . . standard 
form arguments filed in other cases”); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 
No. 00 Civ.6689 SAS, 2003 WL 22801724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (stating 
that objectors’ submissions were “boilerplate and routine. Moreover, this was not the 
first time these counsel have appeared for objectors and raised nearly identical 
objections.”); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973; Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 247–48 (“For the 
most part, these objections are general laments about the perceived unfairness of the 
Proposed Settlement.”). 
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legion.56  Courts have labeled these objectors and their counsel as 
“spoilers,”57 “naysayers,”58 and “professional objectors.”59  More 
pointedly, a growing number of courts state that professional 
objectors are “gnawing on a bone”60 by filing objections in order to 
“extract a fee” from the settling parties.61 
 
56 See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 311 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372, 381–
82 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (objector’s counsel simply retooled research done by his client for 
another case), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2005); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., 
Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. MDL 1500, 02 Civ. 5575(SWK), 2006 WL 903236, at *17 
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006) (noting that criticism of objector’s counsel as submitting 
“canned objections” might be correct, since he had copied whole sentences from prior 
judicial opinion without attribution); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (criticizing 
objector counsel for filing “canned” objection); see also Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 241 
n.22 (recognizing that “many of the objections that have been raised by the so-called 
‘professional objectors’ have been raised in other courts in other class actions”). 
57 Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1378 (9th Cir. 1993). 
58 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 564 
(D.N.J. 1997), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998). 
59 See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. 
Pa. 2003); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973; see also In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & 
ERISA Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 383, 386 (D. Md. 2006) (labeling an objector counsel a 
“professional and generally unsuccessful objector”); In re Compact Disc Minimum 
Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1361, 2003 WL 22417252, at *2 n.3 (D. 
Me. Oct. 7, 2003) (labeling same objectors’ attorney as a “repeat objector”). 
60 Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 
1336640, at *10 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2000).     
61 Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973. For comparably direct characterizations of 
professional objectors, see, for example, In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA 
Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1109 (D. Minn. 2009) (“[Objector counsel’s] goal was, 
and is, to hijack as many dollars for themselves as they can wrest from a negotiated 
settlement.”); UFCW Local 880-Retail Food Employers Joint Pension Fund v. 
Newmont Mining Corp., No. 05-cv-01046-MSK-BNB, 2008 WL 4452332, at *3 (D. 
Colo. Sept. 30, 2008) (attacking objectors “who challenge fee requests largely in the 
hopes of obtaining their own personal payout”), aff’d, 352 F. App’x 232 (10th Cir. 
2009); In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 754 (S.D. Ohio 
2008) (criticizing “opportunistic objectors”); see also In re Holocaust Victim Assets, 
311 F. Supp. 2d at 374–75, 381 (stating that, objector, as his counsel sat by, asked 
trial judge how much he would pay in attorney fees and other monies for objector not 
to appeal settlement approval and that trial court labeled this “blackmail[ ]” and a 
“hold-up”); In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 n.12 (W.D. Pa. 2003) 
(noting, but not adjudicating, an allegation that objector counsel had telephoned 
class counsel and had attempted extortion at that time). Scholars have used 
comparable terms. See, e.g., CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE 182–83 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, May 20, 2002) 
(referring to “the standard extortionist [objector] tactic” of threatening an appeal of 
settlement approval unless class counsel gives objector counsel a share of the class 
counsel fee); Woolley, supra note 46, at 618 (“By filing or threatening to file an 
objection to the settlement, a class member may be able to ‘extort’ a settlement that 
represents a disproportionate amount of the settlement fund.”); Richard B. Schmitt, 
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It is certainly easy enough for “observers, who peer from 
outside the settlement process, [to] second-guess one detail, or 
another.”62  Objector counsel are often attorneys who did not risk 
any of their own time or capital in suing the defendant but 
attempt to take for themselves a portion of the attorney fees 
earned by the class counsel who successfully took on the 
defendant.63  Such objector counsel merely “argue[ ] the nuances 
of the settlement during the twilight of [the] litigation,” instead 
of litigating against the defendants for years and “shoulder[ing] 
the financial burden of pursuing the action.”64  In other instances, 
objector counsel are those who brought their own cases against 
the defendant but failed to achieve any success and seek to 
recoup their time and expense from those attorneys who did 
succeed.65   
 
Objecting to Class-Action Pacts Can Be Lucrative For Attorneys, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
10, 1997, at B1 (quoting Professor Susan Koniak as labeling the tactics of objectors 
as “an extortion game”). 
62 Snell, 2000 WL 1336640, at *10.   
63 See In re Cardinal Health, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (stating that objectors 
“subsist primarily off the skill and labor of, to say nothing of the risk borne by, more 
capable attorneys”); Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 
2006 WL 4037549, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (stating that a large settlement 
“often attracts other lawyers who had nothing to do with the instigation of the case 
to see if they might make some changes in the settlement agreement; thereby, 
permitting them to participate in the award of attorneys’ fees and costs”). Class 
counsel in one Illinois state court class action expressed this view very colorfully: 
“Attorneys who specialize in objecting rather than performing could not have 
achieved these results. This is a classic example of the maxim: ‘Those who can do, 
those who can’t, criticize.’ ” Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Final Approval of 
Class, Block v. McDonald’s Corp., 355 Ill. App. 3d 1174 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at 
www.edcombs.com/CM/Notices/Notices187.asp.   
64 In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 359 (N.D. Ga. 
1993); see also Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that objector counsel “did not propose terms of settlement or otherwise 
participate constructively in the litigation other than to appeal”).   
65 Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 482–83 & 
n.97 (2000) (noting that counsel in competing class actions are prime candidates to 
object to settlements “out of self-interest”); see, e.g., Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell 
Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2002); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 318 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that district court did 
not err in discounting objections of counsel in competing or overlapping class 
actions); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 263 F.R.D. 110, 132 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he principal thrust by [objector counsel] was to preserve the 
viability [of] their separate tag-along state court actions. As such, their objections 
were motivated entirely by self-interest and of no utility to the Class.”); In re 
Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 263 F.R.D. 340, 363 (E.D. La. 2009) (noting 
that some objectors had state court actions that would be enjoined by settlement, so 
they “have an incentive to object to this settlement”); Figueroa v. Sharper Image 
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Perhaps the most outlandish situation occurs when objector 
counsel, on behalf of a class member who has not filed his or her 
own case—and therefore could not recover anything absent a 
classwide resolution—attacks the ability of a class to be 
certified.66  In that instance, professional objectors actually act 
against the interest of their own clients.67  But objector counsel 
themselves can profit from attacking settlement class 
certification, since the parties may pay those counsel a fee to 
drop their objections.  It is relatively simple for professional 
objectors to find some respect in which one or more of the many 
criteria for class certification can be questioned, and it is far 
easier to do that than to become familiar with the often 
voluminous discovery or the details of the settlement 
agreement.68 
 
Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting contention of settlement 
proponents that “the small and vocal minority of class members who have objected 
are fueled by would-be class counsel in competing lawsuits”). However, the relatively 
rarer instance in which objector counsel has achieved some success in a competing 
case--such as a finding of liability--which would be negated by a proposed settlement 
of a different, less advanced case, may call for a different, more favorable view of 
that objector. See, e.g., Smith v. Sprint Commc’ns L.P., 387 F.3d 612, 614–15 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (noting that objector represented competing statewide classes that had 
been certified, had established liability, and was on eve of trial, and rejecting 
nationwide settlement on grounds that settlement proponents did not adequately 
represent certified statewide classe). In such circumstances, the court may be facing 
a “reverse auction,” in which a defendant facing multiple class actions “picks the 
most ineffectual class lawyers to negotiate a settlement with in the hope that the 
district court will approve a weak settlement that will preclude other claims against 
the defendant.” Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002).    
66 See infra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
67 Professor Brunet has noted “the problem of monitoring the monitor.” Brunet, 
supra note 7, at 409. “Clients of counsel who object may be unable to monitor their 
own attorneys effectively. Some objecting by attorneys who represent small stakes 
plaintiffs may be only an effort to obtain attorneys fees’ [sic] for the objecting 
attorney.” id.; see also id. at 425–26.   
68 Objector counsel frequently fail to apprise themselves sufficiently about the 
settlement, so that courts are compelled to note that those counsel misunderstood 
the settlement about which they complain. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets 
Litig, 311 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2005). 
For other cases in which courts found that objectors simply did not understand the 
settlement, see infra note 137. In most cases, objectors do not seek discovery of the 
underlying litigation file, and, often, even when they do, they fail to take advantage 
of the ability to review that material. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 563 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating that objector counsel 
spent only three days in the document depository, where over one million discovery 
documents were available), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998). Objectors can get 
access to the file material without preconditions, see ALBA CONTE & HERBERT 
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §8:32, at 268 (4th ed. 2002), other than 
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Even a baseless objection can delay the implementation of a 
proposed settlement.69  As a result, diligent class counsel may 
agree to “pay off” a professional objector to ensure that their 
clients, the class members, get relief quickly once a settlement is 
finally achieved after many years of litigation.70  Defendants too 
have an interest in removing impediments to an agreed upon 
settlement, so that they can put the litigation behind them.71  
 
signing on to a confidentiality order that is the essentially the same as that 
governing class counsel. Thus, assertions that objectors’ alleged inability to review 
discovery prevents them from learning about the settlement are without merit.   
69 See, e.g., In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 00-5364(GEB), 2006 WL 
2786945, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2006) (stating that since objections were “without 
merit . . . [and] appear to have impeded the Class’s recovery—[those] objections and 
subsequent appeal resulted in wasteful litigation and delayed the distribution of 
funds to the Class”). Other cases have noted that objectors have hindered rather 
than helped the process. See, e.g., Mirfasihi, 2007 WL 2608778, at *6–7 (reducing fee 
by fifty percent for objectors who “burdened the court at least as much as they have 
helped it” despite having benefited the class and the community); In re Prudential 
Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 (D.N.J. 2003) (noting 
that objector counsel seemingly “did everything he could to make this matter as 
inefficient and contentious as possible” and was “often more of an unjustifiable 
hindrance to the progression of this litigation”); Gerstein v. Micron Tech., Inc., Civ. 
No. 89-1262, 1993 WL 735031, at *1 (D. Ida. Jan. 9, 1993); In re Anchor Sec. Litig., 
No. CV-88-3024, 1991 WL 53651, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1991) (noting that objector 
had “clouded rather than sharpened the issues”); Saylor v. Bastedo, 594 F. Supp. 
371, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (awarding no counsel fee for objector who “hindered rather 
than promoted the prosecution of this action”). 
70 See, e.g., Mike Absmeier, The Professional Objector and Revised Rule 23: 
Protecting Voice Rights While Limiting Objector Abuse, 24 REV. LITIG. 609, 627 
(2005). Class actions routinely consume many years. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft 
Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (lasting over ten years); Varacallo v. 
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 253 (D.N.J. 2005) (lasting over eight years). 
After all that time, “jeopardizing a settlement agreement causes prejudice to the 
existing parties to a lawsuit,” see In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 
187 F.R.D. 465, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting United States v. Bowes, 25 F.3d 66, 72 
(2d Cir. 1994)), which often leads class counsel to buy off professional objectors 
rather than delaying still longer the settlement benefits to class members. 
71 Ironically, defendants themselves are partially to blame for the plague of 
objectors. Defendants’ interests have generated a flood of criticism of class actions 
and the attorneys who bring them. For example, the so-called Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.), was propelled by years of extensive lobbying and anti-class action 
propaganda from corporate interests. See, e.g., Public Citizen Congress Watch, 
Unfairness Incorporated: The Corporate Campaign Against Consumer Class Actions, 
1, 18 (June 2003), available at www.citizen.org/documents/ACF2813.pdf (reporting 
that over 475 lobbyists for major corporations, many of whom were the subject of 
class action litigation, had lobbied for anti-class action legislation). As The Wall 
Street Journal stated after President Bush signed the bill into law, “[t]o a 
remarkable degree, the business lobby was able to set the tone of the debate with a 
steady drumbeat of anecdotes portraying wealthy trial lawyers making off with large 
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Objectors play on this to extract a fee.  In their zeal to find 
anything at all to object to, professional objectors sometimes 
make inconsistent arguments within the same objection.72 
The right to object to a settlement can be a useful 
supplement to the other structural protections.  Legitimate 
objectors can bring a measure of adversarialness to the 
settlement stage of a case.73  They can “keep the parties honest” 
by pointing out those rare occasions when a settlement is unfair 
or when a settlement creates conflicts within the settlement 
class.   
But the right to object, though an essential right of class 
members, is easily abused.  Professional objectors seek out cases 
that offer them the ability to extort a fee rather than cases in 
which an unreasonable settlement is proposed.74  Courts must 
 
settlements at the expense of not only corporations but their customers.” David 
Rogers & Monica Langley, Bush Set To Sign Landmark Bill on Class Action, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, at A1. By making all class actions, class counsel, and class 
settlements suspect, defendants’ interests unwittingly emboldened objectors to try to 
block settlements that defendants seek to have approved. 
72 See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv. 8853(SWK), 2007 
WL 4225486, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2007); DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 
F.R.D. 269, 319 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 
207, 235 n.19 (D.N.J. 2005); In re Corel Corp. Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 484, 497 
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (all noting and criticizing inconsistent arguments made by 
professional objector counsel).  
73 See, e.g., Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Cardinal 
Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008); In re Indep. 
Energy Holdings P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 00 Civ. 6689 SAS, 2003 WL 22801724, at *1–
2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003); Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, L.P. v. 
Pricewaterhousecoopers, L.L.P., 212 F.R.D. 400, 412–13 (E.D. Wis. 2002); In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 278 F.3d 175, 201–03 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(Rosenn, J., dissenting). However, cases that assign a high value to mere 
“adversarialness,” unmoored to whether a court would perceive on its own the issues 
that professional objectors raise, are mistaken. Just as class counsel do not earn a 
fee for creating “adversarialness” by filing a case, professional objectors should not 
receive a fee merely for appearing in opposition to a settlement. See infra notes 162–
64 and accompanying text. 
74 Indeed, in the landmark egregious cases where settlements were overturned, 
professional objectors played no role in doing that. Instead, the successful objectors 
were academics, public interest organ izations, government agencies, or private 
attorneys who had comparable cases pending but made their living from such cases 
rather than by objecting to settlements. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 
157 F.R.D. 246, 286, 296–97, 302–04, 306, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that private 
attorneys who had other cases represented objectors, with several law professors as 
their experts; White Lung Association of New Jersey also represented objectors, and 
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice was amicus in opposition to settlement), vacated 83 
F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 
(1997) (noting that other law professors sought, but were denied, status of amicus in 
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discern which objections have potential validity and which are 
filed merely for selfish leverage.75  Objectors and objections that 
aid the court by providing information or arguments that the 
court would not otherwise have or perceive can be useful.76  
Objectors who do not meet that standard should be viewed 
 
opposition to settlement); In re Gen. Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 775–76 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that Public Citizen Litigation 
Group, Center for Auto Safety, and several public agencies, along with a few private 
lawyers, represented objectors); Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 508 
(E.D. Tex. 1995) (noting that private firm that also handled asbestos cases and a 
legal clinic that was a subsidiary of a maritime law firm represented objectors), aff’d 
sub nom. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); see also John Leubsdorf, Co-Opting the Class 
Action, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1222 (1995). The same is true of a poster child for 
alleged class action abuse, Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 
1996), which figured prominently in the campaign to adopt the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 14 (Feb. 28, 2005), (referring to 
the settlement as “now infamous”). That case arose from an underlying decision of 
an Alabama state court judge to approve a settlement in which class members’ bank 
accounts were charged an amount for their attorney fees that exceeded the amounts, 
if any, that they were awarded under the settlement. See generally id. at 14–15; 
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 43, at 1057–80 (detailing facts of settlement). The 
objectors there were the Florida Attorney General and a large private firm whom 
Professor Koniak asked to get involved. Id. at 1057 n.16, 1082 n.103; see also id. at 
1272 (noting that nine state attorneys general participated as amici in the Seventh 
Circuit in support of the settled class). Many of the settlements that cause the 
greatest concern to scholars are those that arise under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), where no opt-outs are permitted, and mass tort cases, 
where problems such as conflicts between current and future claimants and other 
issues unique to the mass tort context present themselves. See supra note 36. 
Professional objectors have been noticeably absent from those cases.      
75 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(5) requires court approval before an 
objection can be withdrawn. In theory, that rule offers a way to call the bluff of 
objectors whose objections will ultimately be found groundless. See MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4, §21.643, at 328; Absmeier, supra note 70, at 
634. But Rule 23(e)(5) is no panacea. Many judges may not wish to look behind 
objections that have effectively been mooted by being withdrawn. Id. That will be 
particularly so when the parties represent that the withdrawal was with their 
consent. Courts have enough to do in addressing objections that are not withdrawn 
and in the larger endeavor of ensuring that settlements are fair, reasonable, and 
adequate. But see Yeagley v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-03403 CRB, 2008 WL 
171083, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (rejecting attempt to withdraw objections, 
finding that “class counsel simply ‘bought off’ objectors’ counsel” in exchange for 
agreement to withdraw objections and noting that approving withdrawal of 
objections would “encourage attorneys to interject objections for the sole purpose of 
extracting a payment from class counsel”).   
76 Great Neck Capital, 212 F.R.D. at 415–16 (fee awarded to objectors who raised 
issues that “otherwise would have gone unnoticed”); cf. Woolley, supra note 46, at 
603 (arguing that the right to be heard and participate in class action litigation “is 
properly conceived as the right to present admissible evidence and make 
nonfrivolous legal arguments that otherwise would not be placed before the Court”). 
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skeptically.  Merely “sharpening the issues” or, even more 
amorphously, otherwise “assisting the court” should not earn a 
fee.77   
Under this standard, certain broad types of objections, no 
matter who asserts them, appear to be presumptively invalid or, 
at the very least, unworthy of a fee award.  All objections by 
professional objectors who surface in cases solely to extract a fee 
should be treated similarly.   
II. PRESUMPTIVELY VALUELESS OBJECTIONS THAT OBJECTORS 
AND PROFESSIONAL OBJECTOR COUNSEL OFTEN RAISE 
Certain categories of objections appear to be presumptively 
useless to judges who are weighing settlement approval.  This is 
because judges, as fiduciaries for the class,78 are already aware of 
the relevant legal principles that objectors might raise, or for 
other reasons stated in this Section.  Accordingly, these types of 
objections should rarely, if ever, be credited and should certainly 
not be a basis for a fee award to objector counsel. 
A. Objections to the Form, Content, or Timing of Notice 
Rule 23(e)(1) requires that notice of the pendency of a class 
action be sent to all class members who would be bound by the 
proposed settlement.79  That notice must be given “in a 
reasonable manner.”80  The object of the notice is to summarize 
the litigation and the settlement, to apprise class members of 
their rights to inspect the complete settlement documents, and to 
accept the settlement, object to it, or exclude themselves from it.81   
There is always a tension between notice being too general 
and being so detailed that it cannot be understood.82  It is easy 
 
77 See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text. 
78 See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text. 
79 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1). If a class was not already certified in the course of the 
litigation but a settlement class is being proposed as part of the settlement, the 
notice must also satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) regarding class 
certification. 
80 Id. 23(e)(1).  
81 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005); In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 326–27 (3d Cir. 
1998); Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir. 1975). 
82 See, e.g., DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 300 (W.D. Tex. 2007) 
(noting that objectors attacked notice as “confusing” while, “in the next breath,” 
arguing that notice should have included other information that court found 
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for an objector either to demand more specificity or to complain 
that a notice that contains too much specificity is too complex.83  
In fact, there is “a wide range of possible notices, . . . each of 
which would strike an appropriate balance between inclusiveness 
and brevity.”84   
The form and content of the notice is within the discretion of 
the trial court and must be approved by that court before it is 
issued.85  Thus, objections to notice seek to second-guess the 
court, not the class counsel who supposedly need to be kept 
honest.   
The timing of notice is largely settled.  Cases around the 
country repeatedly state that thirty to sixty days notice is 
sufficient to allow class members to make their decision to accept 
the settlement, object, or exclude themselves.86   
Professional objectors frequently make the same boilerplate 
complaints about notice, such as the oft-repeated, but unrealistic, 
contention that notice should tell each class member how much 
 
“complicated and potentially confusing”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 528 (D.N.J. 1997) (“On the one hand, the notice 
must be readable. . . . And, on the other hand, the parties must be careful to include 
the requisite core information.”), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 
Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that 
some objectors challenged notice as omitting certain items, while others complained 
that notice “contains too much information and is overly complicated”). 
83 There is an almost infinite array of facts or other matters that, arguably, 
might be included in a notice. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 962 (noting that 
objectors demanded that the content of objections be included in notice); Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1317 (3d Cir. 1993) (objectors complained that notice 
should have included various items); In re Prudential, 962 F. Supp. at 528–33 
(noting that objectors cited a dozen different items that allegedly should have been 
included in notice); UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05-CV-73991-DT, 2006 WL 
891151, at *33 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2006) (“A summary, by its nature, cannot 
discuss every term of the [settlement] agreement.”).   
84 In re Prudential, 962 F. Supp. at 528; see In re Metro. Life Ins. Co. Sales 
Practices Litig., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22688, at *52 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1999) 
(noting that some objectors demanded more detail while others argued notice was 
already too complex “demonstrated that the Class Notice Package strikes a proper 
balance and provides sufficient information in as clear and concise a manner as 
possible given the nature of the proposed settlement”). 
85 For examples of cases applying the abuse of discretion standard to review a 
settlement notice, see Int’l Union v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 630 (6th Cir. 
2007); Bell Atl. Corp., 2 F.3d at 1317. 
86 See, e.g., In re Prudential, 962 F. Supp. at 562 (citing cases); 3 ALBA CONTE & 
HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:37, at 276 (4th ed. 2002). At 
least one case held that twelve days notice was sufficient. Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. 
Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1980).     
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he or she might receive under the settlement.87  There is virtually 
“nothing new under the sun”88 in terms of objections to notice.  
Those objections to notice that have been and continue to be 
made are virtually all insupportable in the normal case.  
That is particularly so now that settlement notices routinely 
include a toll-free telephone number for class members to call for 
more information and a website that provides more detail about 
the settlement and, often, copies of pleadings, settlement papers, 
and more.89  Any class member with questions about the notice 
can receive answers regardless of the notice's clarity regardless of 
how clear the notice is.90  For all these reasons, objections to the 
form, content, or timing of notice should be considered 
presumptively invalid.91  Objectors often merely cloud the issues 
with their attacks on notice.92   
 
87 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 962 (finding no reason why notice should 
“analyze the expected value [of fully litigating the case]”); Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 
200 F.3d 1140, 1153 (8th Cir. 1999); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 263 
F.R.D. 340, 360 (E.D. La. 2009); In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 
231, 253 (D. Del. 2002), aff’d, 391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2004); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 227 (D.N.J. 2005) (stating that “each Class Member’s 
individual circumstances and every contingency could not possibly be summarized in 
any Notice”); Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
see also In re Corel Corp. Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(finding the objection that notice did not afford class members “enough information 
to adequately assess the prospects of litigation” was “without merit”). 
88 Ecclesiastes 1:9. 
89 In re Warfarin, 212 F.R.D. at 252. 
90 See, e.g., Meyenburg v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:05-cv-15-DGW, 2006 WL 
5062697, at *7 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2006) (finding that the notice need not have included 
the entire settlement agreement, particularly where long form notice, release, and 
other material was available on website and class members could telephone class 
counsel toll-free for answers to questions); Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 227. 
91 For a rare instance in which the parties simply failed to include in the notice 
the items required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2), leading to the 
rejection of that notice, see Larson v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 07-5325(JLL), 2009 
WL 1228443, at *10–11 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2009). Occasionally, objections to the 
method of disseminating notice are found valid. See In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., No. CV01-11115 RSWL(CWX), 2004 WL 2792185, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 
2004) (ordering re-noticing of class members on finding that a strong likelihood 
existed that a substantial portion of the class would not have received timely notice). 
And, of course, if settling parties fail to send individual notice even though such 
notice is plainly practicable and reasonable, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (stating 
that notice of class certification, applicable where no litigation class was certified 
prior to settlement, must be “the best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances”); id. 23(e)(1) (stating that notice of settlement must be disseminated 
“in a reasonable manner”), an objection to the settlement on that basis would 
certainly be appropriate. See Larson, 2009 WL 1228443, at *5, *7, *9 (noting that 
requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) are “more stringent” than those of Rule 23(e)(1), and 
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B. Objections to Class Counsel Fees 
Class counsel fees are a prominent issue in virtually every 
settlement.  Each Circuit has one or more leading cases on that 
subject.93  As a result, courts are already aware of the standards 
for fee awards even without submissions from objectors.94  In the 
instances in which courts have reduced the fees requested, they 
likely would have done so even without objector submissions.95 
Moreover, there is a range of reasonableness for attorney 
fees.96  Thus an objector can always assert that class counsel 
should have received less, making this a fertile argument for 
professional objectors.  Nonetheless, the trial judge’s award 
should be affirmed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion, 
which is an extraordinarily rare occurrence.97  Accordingly, 
appellate objections that class counsel received too high a fee are 
unlikely to be useful.   
Furthermore, encouraging objections to class counsel fees 
runs counter to the settled policy of using generous fee awards to 
incentivize class counsel to bring risky litigation in the public 
 
holding that individual notice of pendency and settlement is required under Rule 
23(c)(2) where less than all, but a “significant amount of [class members] have been 
identified” with individual addresses).     
92 In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 
2008). 
93 See, e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 190 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2000). For a useful 
summary of the approaches of many Circuits to percentage of the fund awards in 
particular, see Nilsen v. York Cnty., 400 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273–76 (D. Me. 2005). 
94 In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 263 F.R.D. 110, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); In re Cardinal Health, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 753; In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 01-cv-01451-REB-CBS, 2007 WL 2087536, at *3 (D. Colo. July 
17, 2007); Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (D. Del. 2003). 
95 In re Qwest, 2007 WL 2087536, at *2–3; In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. 
Supp. 2d 491, 520 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Gerstein v. Micron Tech., Inc., Civ. No. 89-1262, 
1993 WL 735031, at *1 (D. Ida. Jan. 9, 1993); In re Anchor Sec. Litig., CV-88-3024, 
1991 WL 53651, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1991).  
96 See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 
341 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[M]ultiples ranging from one to four are frequently awarded in 
common fund cases when the lodestar method is applied.” (quoting WILLIAM B. 
RUBENSTEIN, HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS; 
§ 14.6, at 17 (3d ed. 1992))); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (surveying range of percentage awards); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up 
Truck Fuel Tank Product Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting fee 
awards range from nineteen to four-five percent). 
97 See, e.g., Taubenfeld v. Aon Corp., 415 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2005); Gunter, 
223 F.3d at 195–96 (applying abuse of discretion standard). 
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interest.98  Class counsel normally handle such cases on a 
contingent basis, under which they risk not only their time but 
often millions of dollars in out of pocket expenses.99  Objectors’ 
insistence on less than generous fees would kill the goose that 
lays the golden egg of recoveries for class members who, by 
definition, cannot economically fight for themselves.100  
Finally, the duty of courts to protect the class in the 
settlement context is already accentuated under Rule 23 in the 
area of counsel fees.101  For this reason too, there is no reason to 
encourage objections to class counsel fees.102 
 
98 See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 193 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing the need for fee structures negotiated under PSLRA to “provid[e] 
counsel with incentives to perform excellent work”); Florin v. Nationsbank of Ga., 60 
F.3d 1245, 1247 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he court must also be careful to sustain the 
incentive for attorneys to continue to represent such clients on an ‘inescapably 
contingent’ basis.” (quoting Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 1992))); 
Jones v. Dominion Res. Servs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) 
(recognizing public policy in favor of sufficient fees to ensure that competent counsel 
will take on “ ‘the often risky and arduous task of representing a class’ ” (quoting In 
re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig, 172 F. Supp. 2d 178, 188 (E.D. Va. 2001)); In re 
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Domestic 
Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 306 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (discussing “the 
financial incentive necessary to induce experienced and well-qualified counsel to 
take on complex and time-consuming cases for the benefit of the public and for which 
they may never be paid or even reimbursed for considerable out-of-pocket 
expenses”); Coffee, supra note 22, at 398 (referring to undesirability of reducing 
economic incentives for class counsel to act as “private attorneys general”). 
99 See, e.g., Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 256 (D.N.J. 
2005) (awarding over $2.5 million in expenses); In re NASDAQ Market-Makers 
Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 489–90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (awarding over $4.4 million 
in expenses); In re Domestic Air, 148 F.R.D. at 306 (awarding over $1.6 million in 
expenses).   
100 This principle derives from the superiority criterion of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3), which addresses, in subsection (A), “the class members’ interests 
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions,” as opposed 
to a class action. The superiority criterion weighs in favor of a class action where the 
amounts involved are relatively small or where there are other reasons why class 
members would not pursue individual actions against the defendant. See, e.g., 
Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2003). In such 
instances, the only way that victims have a chance to recover their losses is if class 
counsel are willing to take the risk of contingent class action litigation, which 
requires potential fees sufficient to entice them to take that extraordinary risk. 
101 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
102 Courts have reduced fee requests even when no objector has challenged them. 
See, e.g., Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 307 F.3d 997, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 
2002); Munoz v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., No. C 07-00970 MHP, 2009 WL 1626376, 
at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2009); Gribble v. Cool Transports, Inc., No. CV 06-04863 
GAF (SHx), 2008 WL 5281665, at *11–12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008); In re Top 
Tankers Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 13761(CM), 2008 WL 2944620, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. July 
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Professional objectors who object to fees ultimately wish to 
claim much of the “savings” for themselves.103  They are far from 
disinterested advocates seeking to protect the class.  Fee 
objections from pro se class members are problematic for a 
different reason: they are usually unsupported by applicable 
attorney fees caselaw principles.  Instead, they are often based 
on: (1) misplaced comparisons between the amount of class 
members’ individual recoveries and class counsel’s aggregate fee, 
which is often a percentage of the total classwide settlement; or 
(2) bald assertions that the attorneys are getting too much or 
that class actions are worthless to the class and benefit only the 
lawyers.104  Perhaps the only valid objections to fees may come 
from state pension funds or other institutional clients whose 
counsel are not seeking a piece of the fee for themselves.105   
As a policy matter, objections to class counsel fees, even if 
valid and based on considerations that the court would not 
otherwise perceive, do not produce enough benefits to the class to 
justify the disincentive that such objections pose to enticing 
counsel to take on risky class action matters.  If a fee is reduced 
and the difference goes back to the defendants, the class obtains 
no benefit at all.  Even where the reduction in the fee goes to the 
class, the amounts involved are so small that the benefit to the 
class is de minimis.106  But fee reductions—except in the rare 
case in which class counsel seek a fee that is outside the range of 
reasonableness—have the effect of discouraging attorneys from 
risking their time and incurring the substantial expense of 
handling these purely contingent cases.107  Particularly since 
 
31, 2008); In re Renaissancere Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 6764(WHP), 
2008 WL 236684, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2008); Silberblatt v. Morgan Stanley, 524 
F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Nienaber v. Citibank, N.A., CIV No. 04-4054, 
2007 WL 2003761, at *5 (D.S.D. July 5, 2007); see also, e.g., Sutton v. Bernard, 504 
F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding the district court incorrectly reduced the fee 
that no one had objected to and reversing and remanding because the district court 
based its fee reduction on the “degree of success”); Gunter, 223 F.3d at 192. 
103 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
104 See, e.g., In re Xcel Energy Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 980, 
997–98 (D. Minn. 2005); Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 252; In re Domestic Air, 148 F.R.D. 
at 306. 
105 See In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. 
Ohio 2008) (reducing class counsel fee based on objections by state pension funds). 
106 In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., 455 F.3d 160, 168 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting this de 
minimis effect, though in a different context). 
107 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text; see also Brunet, supra note 
7, at 431–32. 
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judges are already acutely aware of the governing standards, fee 
objections should be discouraged, and objectors who make them 
should not be compensated even if the class counsel fee is 
reduced. 
Recognizing that the amount of the class counsel fee is 
within the court’s broad discretion, professional objector counsel 
frequently demand that all or part of that fee be withheld until 
the settlement claims and distribution process is complete.108  
Objector counsel then seek a fee based on this “benefit” to the 
class.  This objection plays on the surface appeal of the notion 
that class counsel should not be compensated until class 
members receive their settlement benefits.  However, class 
counsel are already under a fiduciary duty to represent the class 
zealously until the end.  Especially when the class counsel have a 
track record of excellent performance, there is no need to “stage” 
their fees to ensure that they continue to represent the class 
properly.109  Class counsel have a right to prompt payment after 
their long years of fighting for the class without compensation.110  
Prompt payment is necessary to encourage class counsel to take 
on such risky cases.111   
C. Objections to Class Certification by a Class Member Who, 
Absent Class Certification, Would Recover Nothing from the 
Defendant  
A court must find that a proposed settlement class satisfies 
the requirements of Rule 23 in addition to determining that the 
settlement itself is fair, reasonable, and adequate.112  Among the 
 
108 Many cases reject this argument, see, for example, In re AT&T, 455 F.3d at 
174–75; Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 251–52. But see Perez v. Asurion Corp., No. 06-
20734-CIV, 2007 WL 2591180, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2007) (ordering that nearly 
thirty-three percent of fee was to be escrowed until ten days after defendants 
certified to provision of settlement relief, in accordance with court’s “practice in most 
class actions,” having nothing to do with objectors’ advocacy).  
109 See In re AT&T, 455 F.3d at 174–75 (finding “no indication [that] class 
counsel would stop working diligently on behalf of the class”); In re Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 106 F. Supp. 2d 721, 734 (D.N.J. 2000) (noting that 
“[e]ven in the time since the settlement in this matter was finally approved, Class 
Counsel have continued to remain actively involved in the matter”). 
110 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
111 For a discussion of the need for incentives to induce counsel to handle risky 
class action matters, see supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
112 In re Gen. Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 
794–97 (3d Cir. 1995). An exception to that principle is that, since the proposal is 
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most cynical objections are those made to certification of a class 
by a settlement class member who could not recover anything 
from the defendant if the settlement were disapproved.  Such 
objections occur when that class member has not filed his or her 
own lawsuit, and when there is no competing class action, 
perhaps with a different class definition, to afford potential 
relief.113  As a result, if the settlement fails due to a supposed 
impropriety in certifying a settlement class or otherwise, the 
class member would have no chance of recovery at all.   
Objections by class members that would not recover if 
settlement were not approved are a frequent stratagem of 
professional objectors, who often find it easier to attack abstract 
class certification criteria than to understand the details of the 
settlement or the particular underlying facts of the case.114  
Counsel use these objections to try to obtain a fee for themselves, 
but the objections, if successful, are actually to the detriment of 
their clients, who will get nothing if the settlement fails.  If a 
class member does not like a settlement or the proposed 
settlement class, he or she should exercise the right to be 
excluded from that settlement.115  Objector counsel do not advise 
 
that there be no trial, the superiority prong of Rule 23(b)(3) need not be satisfied by 
a settlement class. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997). 
113 In contrast, where there is another pending putative class action, an 
objection to class certification is not facially absurd. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 313 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that 
objector Krell contended that his own putative statewide class action, involving only 
certain of the claims encompassed in the nationwide class action, would have 
afforded more relief as to those claims than did the nationwide class action to which 
he objected).   
114 For examples of this phenomenon, see In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 
Nos. 04-5184(GEB), 05-1079(GEB), 2007 WL 2589950, at *13–15 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 
2007) (noting that objector Van Enterprises opposed class certification but had not 
filed its own case), aff’d, 579 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2009); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 229, 232 (D.N.J. 2005) (noting an objection to class 
certification by objector Wolfson, who had not filed her own case). In In re Insurance 
Brokerage, the Third Circuit found it “peculiar that [the Van Enterprise objectors’] 
interests [were] so closely aligned with the non-settling defendants” but nonetheless 
accepted those arguments at face value. 579 F.3d at 261 n.21. 
115 Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) affords a right to exclusion that 
applies to settlement classes as well as litigation classes. Rule 23(e)(3) may give 
members of an already certified litigation class a second opportunity to exclude 
themselves when the case is settled. These opt-out rights, however, are available 
only in monetary damage cases under Rule 23(b)(3). The discussion in the text is 
limited to such cases. Professional objectors rarely surface in cases not falling under 
Rule 23(b)(3), since such cases generally do not generate a fund from which class 
counsel, and, derivatively, objector counsel, can seek a fee.   
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their clients to exclude themselves because they would then lack 
standing to object to the settlement, thus depriving objector 
counsel of their potential payday.116  Courts should see through 
this stratagem and reject such objections out of hand. 
D. Objections That Supposedly “Improve the Settlement” at the 
Margins 
Objectors whose objections result in substantial 
improvements of the proposed settlement can get attorney fees, 
whether a percentage of the value of the improvement or 
otherwise.117  However, courts have awarded fees to objectors who 
proposed only more marginal improvements to settlements.118  
Since, by definition, a settlement is never the optimal result for 
the plaintiffs,119 there is always room for an objector to demand 
more and then, if the parties acquiesce, to seek a fee. 
Courts routinely state that they will not second-guess the 
views of class and defense counsel who have lived the case if the 
settlement presented by the parties is within the range of 
reasonableness.120  Objector counsel should not be able to do so 
either. 
Once again, the delays in the provision of the agreed-upon 
relief to the class and the other negatives that objectors present 
outweigh any marginal benefits that their objections may 
occasionally produce for the class.  A settlement that falls within 
the range of reasonableness is approvable and should be 
approved.  Only very rarely is an objector’s proposed 
improvement substantial.  Even more infrequently does it lift a 
proposed settlement that is below the range of reasonableness 
 
116 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5) (“Any class member may object to the 
propos[ed settlement] if it requires court approval under this subdivision (e) . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 1989).    
117 See infra notes 154–56, 160 and accompanying text. 
118 See infra notes 157–59 and accompanying text. 
119 See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 317 
(3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]fter all, settlement is a compromise, a yielding of the highest 
hopes in exchange for certainty and resolution.”); Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
216 F.R.D. 55, 65 (S.D.N.Y 2003) (stating that a settlement is not a “wish-list of 
class members that the Defendant must fulfill”).   
120 See, e.g., Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 211 F.R.D. 457, 467 
(S.D. Fla. 2002); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 
450, 543 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998).    
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 949 (2010) 
2010] KEEPING THE FLIES OUT OF THE OINTMENT 979 
into the reasonable range.121  Those are the only circumstances in 
which an objection that seeks to “improve the settlement” should 
even be considered. 
E. Objections to Securities Fraud Settlements in Which 
Institutional Investors Have Served as Lead Plaintiff 
Securities fraud cases under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act122 afford class members yet another layer of 
protection beyond that provided by the inherent obligations of 
the class counsel and the fiduciary duty of the court.123  The 
PSLRA requires that the court appoint as lead plaintiff the 
member or members of the putative class whom the court 
“determines to be most capable of adequately representing the 
interests of class members.”124  The court-appointed lead plaintiff 
is then to select class counsel, but that choice must be approved 
by the court.125   
Congress’s goal in adopting the PSLRA was to place control 
of securities fraud class actions in the hands of large institutional 
lead plaintiffs, rather than small investors, whom Congress 
perceived were controlled by their attorneys.126  Institutional 
investors were viewed as more sophisticated and more 
independent and therefore more able to protect the interests of 
the class, including, when necessary, standing up to class counsel 
who might accept a settlement that falls short of the range of 
 
121 The more common case is that the “improvement” arguably affords a 
relatively small additional benefit to the class. However, the class, class counsel, and 
defendants all have an incentive to adopt the objector’s “improvement” to make the 
objector go away and permit the settlement to proceed to approval. See supra notes 
57–60, 70 and accompanying text. But that is no basis to take a portion of class 
counsel’s hard-earned fee and give it to opportunistic objector counsel. See also infra 
notes 157–61 and accompanying text. At most, objector counsel might justifiably be 
awarded a lodestar-based fee payable by the defendant. 
122 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006). 
123 For discussion of those obligations and duties, see supra notes 14–31 and 
accompanying text.  
124 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B). 
125 See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). 
126 See, e.g., In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020 
(N.D. Cal. 1999); Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997) 
(“[T]hrough the PSLRA, Congress has unequivocally expressed its preference for 
securities fraud litigation to be directed by large institutional investors.”); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“The Conference Committee seeks 
to increase the likelihood that institutional investors will serve as lead 
plaintiffs . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
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reasonableness due to counsel’s own concerns.127  Congress’s 
objective has been realized in many, if not most, securities fraud 
class actions, as state pension funds and other large institutions 
have stepped forward to claim the mantle of lead plaintiff.128 
In at least two recent cases, institutional lead plaintiffs have 
taken securities fraud cases to trial, resulting in one jury verdict 
for the defense and the other verdict for the plaintiffs.129  The 
sophistication and independence of institutional lead plaintiffs 
offers substantial guarantees that they will not enter into an 
inadequate settlement.  Objections to settlements reached by 
such lead plaintiffs should therefore be considered presumptively 
unpersuasive.   
F. Objections by Professional Objectors 
Professional objectors find a way to object to any substantial 
settlement that offers a large fee, seeking a piece for 
themselves.130 But their objections are almost invariably 
frivolous. For example, the objections of one professional objector, 
E.F.S., have been rejected repeatedly by courts around the 
 
127 See, e.g., Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 
F.R.D. 688, 691 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (stating that the holder of “largest financial stake 
can best prosecute the claims” and “is presumed best able to negotiate with and 
oversee counsel”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32, 34 (1995). For the argument that 
class counsel are likely to be more risk-averse than their clients, particularly as the 
case proceeds further along, see Coffee, supra note 22, at 390–91. 
128 See, e.g., Elliot J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a 
Decade, or “Look What’s Happened to My Baby”, 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 551–52 
(2008) (noting that, after a slow start, institutional investors have increasingly 
sought and obtained roles as lead plaintiff); LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2008 REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS 11 (2009), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/ 
c94cedf0-2a04-4779-840d-5accf866dd4f/Presentation/NewsAttachment/732194ea-
2f86-40cd-bb7e-5bc7c530dcfe/Cornerstone_Research_Settlements_2008_Analysis.pdf 
(stating that institutions served as lead plaintiffs in almost sixty percent of 
securities settlements in 2008, and cases involving institutional investors, 
particularly public pension plans, as lead plaintiffs are associated with higher 
settlement amounts); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions 
Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 877–78 (2005). 
129 See Ashby Jones, Theory & Practice: JDS Wins Investor Lawsuit, Bucking a 
Trend—Firm Goes to Trial Rather Than Settling, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2008, at B4; 
see also In re Apollo Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV-04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 
3072731 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2008), rev’d, and reinstated jury verdict, In re Apollo 
Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971 (9th Cir. June 23, 2010) (unpublished 
memorandum opinion).   
130 See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text. 
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country, often accompanied by severe criticism of the arguments 
that he made.131  Another professional objector, L.S., who has 
touted himself as “nationally and internationally recognized as 
an authority on the issue of class action abuse, particularly in the 
area of excessive attorneys’ fee awards,”132 has seen one court 
determine that his papers were “at best, negligently created and, 
at worst, suspiciously manufactured”133 and his objections 
rejected out of hand in many other cases.134  Likewise, many 
 
131 The full names of this and other professional objectors are omitted from this 
article.  Readers interested in the identities of those professional objectors can find 
those names in the cited cases.  For cases involving  E.F.S., see, e.g., In re AT&T 
Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 172 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (labeling one argument “misleading” and 
rejected all arguments); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., No. 06-2964, 2007 
WL 2153284 (3d Cir. 2007); In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. 
Supp. 2d 1107, 1108–09 & n.1 (D. Minn. 2009) (characterizing position of objector 
counsel, including E.F.S., as “disingenuous,” “preposterous,” and “laughable,” among 
other criticisms); Grays Harbor Adventist Christian Sch. v. Carrier Corp., No. 05-
05437 RBL, 2008 WL 1901988, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2008) (finding that 
objection “ignores applicable law”); Browning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C04-01463 HRL, 
2007 WL 4105971 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007); Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp. 2d 
1360, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (stating that the court “did not find any of the papers 
filed by Objectors’ Counsel to be particularly helpful or to have conferred a benefit on 
the Class, as they were generic compilations of well-known case law and lacked 
specific application to this case,” but because E.F.S.’s appearance at oral argument 
“provided a safety check for the parties and the Court,” he would be reimbursed his 
travel expenses and a reasonable hourly rate for time actually spent at settlement 
hearing).      
132 Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Syst., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974 (E.D. Tex. 2000) 
(discussing profiessional objector L.S.). 
133 Id. at 975 & n.19 (admonishing L.S. and revoking his admission pro hac vice). 
134 See, e.g., UFCW Local 880 Joint Pension Fund v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 
05-cv-01046-MSK-BNB, 2008 WL 4452332, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2008) (stating 
that L.S., who appeared pro se in that case, had merely raised same objection as 
another, and his objection was “general in nature, largely unsupported by specific 
citation to the record or to supporting caselaw,” and “lacking in meaningful 
analysis”; denying L.S. the “incentive award” he sought for his participation), aff’d, 
352 F. App’x 232 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 
586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 811–17 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (rejecting numerous “picky” objections 
to attorney fees based on “no authority”); In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust 
Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 479–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting objections with “no authority” 
in support of the objection, “contrary to the law,” and otherwise meritless). In 
particular, L.S. often demands the appointment of a “guardian” for the class, despite 
his previous recognition, see Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 974–75, and the applicable law 
stating, see supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text, that the court is already the 
guardian of the class. Courts have repeatedly and emphatically refused to accept 
L.S.’s demand for a “guardian.” See, e.g., In re Enron, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 811–12; In 
re NASDAQ, 187 F.R.D. at 481; In re Intelligent Electronics Sec. Litig., No. 92-CV-
1905, 1997 WL 786984, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1997); see also Weissman v. Quail 
Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting district court finding 
that L.S.’s arguments were “groundless, contrived and misplaced” and that his 
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courts have rebuffed, often harshly, the objections of another 
serial objector, E.C.135 
Professional objectors often make the same objections in case 
after case.136  Courts frequently note that these counsel do not 
even understand the settlement to which they object.137  Some 
decisions have even sanctioned or harshly criticized the conduct 
of professional objectors.138  Serial objector counsel often make 
 
participation in the case “reflects a serious lack of professionalism and good 
judgment” and refuing to disturb those conclusions, but vacating a “vexatious 
litigant” order that forbade him from filing objections to other class action 
settlements). 
135 See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 538 (3d Cir. 
2004) (finding that E.C.’s objection was made “without the support of expert 
evaluation, citation, or discovery”); In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig., 
643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1108–09 (D. Minn. 2009) (condemning objection in colorful 
language); Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 2006 WL 
4037549, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (finding that objections by E.C. and other 
“Coordinated Objectors” made no material contribution); In re Relafen Antitrust 
Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 80 n.21 (D. Mass. 2005) (finding that objection was 
contradicted by the record); Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 
246 (D.N.J. 2005) (finding that objector had “fail[ed] to substantiate [his] argument 
with anything more than speculation and one [groundless] example”); Clark v. 
Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 8:00-1217-22, 2004 WL 256433 (D.S.C. Jan. 14, 
2004); In re VisaCheck Money Master Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
136 For example, serial objector counsel K.N. routinely demands that class 
counsel’s fee be paid in installments rather than all at once. That objection fails 
again and again, see, e.g., In re AT&T, 455 F.3d at 174; Perez, 2007 WL 2591174, at 
*1; Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 251–52, but there is nothing to keep him and others who 
parrot that argumen from raising it again in another case in hopes of generating a 
fee. 
137 Serial objector counsel J.P. has been the subject of a series of opinions finding 
his objections groundless and stating that he simply did not understand the 
settlements to which he objected. See, e.g., In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 
F. Supp. 2d 297, 350–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (labeling J.P.’s objections “meritless” and 
“based in part upon [a] misconception”); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised 
Price Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1361, 2003 WL 22417252, at *2 & n.3 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 
2003) (finding that J.P., a “repeat objector,” had filed a “groundless objection,” 
imposing an appeal bond because his appeal “might be frivolous,” and noting that 
sanctions on appeal were “a real possibility”); In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust 
Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 258 (D. Del. 2002), aff’d, 391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(approving settlement despite objection and finding that J.P., and other serial 
objector counsel, had misunderstood allocation and distribution plan); Tenuto v. 
Transworld Sys., Inc., No. 99-4228, 2002 WL 188569, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2002) 
(approving settlement and finding that J.P. had been unaware of applicable law and 
had misstated value of settlement).   
138 See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 551 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2767 (2009) (objector attorney fees had been “cut it in half as 
a sanction for their irresponsible litigation tactics”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
Sales Practices Litig., 278 F.3d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming in part sanctions 
against objector counsel); Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806 
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arguments that are obviously unsupported by the record.139  To 
add insult to injury, these slipshod objections are frequently 
submitted late.140 
Current law does not require courts to ask whether objectors 
or their counsel have a track record of groundless objections.  
Proponents of the settlement are left to ferret out and inform the 
court of the unsavory histories of serial objectors and their 
professional objector counsel.  Objectors and their counsel 
purport to be acting in the best interest of the entire class.  They 
do so in opposition to the court-appointed attorneys for that class, 
who must demonstrate their adequacy.141   
In light of the prevelance of serial objectors and the problems 
they cause, objectors and their counsel should be required to 
prove their own adequacy by submitting a list of cases in which 
they have represented objectors to class action settlements, what 
objections were raised, and what the results of those cases 
were.142  This requirement would place objector counsel in a 
 
n.32 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 2008) (offending paper filed by objector withdrawn after 
sanctions motion filed); Perez, 2007 WL 2591174, at *1 n.1 (criticizing tone of 
submissions by professional objector counsel as “unprofessional and antagonistic,” 
which court found “unproductive and unacceptable”); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 975 
(revoking pro hac vice admission of objector counsel after noting that counsel had 
“submitted documents to [the] Court which [were], at best, negligently created and, 
at worst, suspiciously manufactured”). 
139 Such cases have been cited throughout this Article. In addition, see, for 
example Mirfasihi, 551 F.3d at 687 (citing “the many inaccurate and misleading 
statements in [objectors’] briefs and post-argument submission”); In re Cendant 
Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 233 n.18, 235, 236, 238 n.20 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
numerous objections by group of objector counsel as such objections were 
“undermined by the evidence in the record,” were “purely speculative,” and based on 
“conjecture”); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. MDL 1500, 02 Civ. 5575(SWK), 2006 
WL 903236, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006) (rebuffing objection as “conclusory”). 
140 See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 311 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting individual objector’s input was “belated”), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150 
(2d Cir. 2005); In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 
1109 & n.1 (D. Minn. 2009) (noting objectors filed two weeks late); Varacallo, 226 
F.R.D. at 245–46; In re Lorazepam & Chlorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 
404 (D.D.C. 2002); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 124 n.29 
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that objector’s challenge to class counsel fees was not raised 
below and therefore would not be considered). 
141 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3), (g)(1)(B). 
142 The results of such a required disclosure may be illuminating. Some objector 
counsel have repeatedly represented the same purported client, who sometimes 
shares a last name with objector counsel. See, e.g., In re MetLife Demutualization 
Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that objector counsel J.P. 
represented J.P., Jr.); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., No. 04-5184, 2009 WL 
411856, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2009) (noting that J.P. represented objector Connie P. 
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comparable situation to that of attorneys seeking appointment as 
class counsel, who routinely submit firm resumes or declarations 
detailing their class action experience and results achieved.143  
Objections by professional objectors who have a proven track 
record of groundless or boilerplate objections, or both, should be 
presumptively invalid.144  There is certainly no due process or 
 
Realty Company); Meyenburg v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:05-cv-15-DGW, 2006 WL 
5062697, at *7 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2006) (J.P. represented objector David P.); In re 
Serzone Products Liab. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 221, 228 n.9 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (J.P. again 
represented David P.)); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., No. 06-2964, 2007 WL 
2153284, at *1 (3d Cir. July 27, 2007) (noting that objector counsel E.F.S. 
represented objector Rita Carfagna); Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 
1378 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (E.F.S. again represented Ms. Carfagna). The PSLRA was 
enacted, in part, to foreclose class counsel from maintaining a stable of class action 
plaintiffs who could instantly file suits that Congress viewed as questionable. See, 
e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S9074 (daily ed. June 26, 1995) (Sen. Hatch) (“Often, the firms 
[involved in perceived strike suits] use the same professional plaintiffs in multiple 
suits.”). The judicial system has the same interest in ensuring that serial objectors 
do not generate questionable objections to class action settlements that, if approved, 
would benefit thousands of persons. Moreover, courts have declined to appoint as 
class counsel an attorney who is closely related to the named plaintiff. [cases cited].  
Objector counsel should not be treated better than class counsel would be in this 
regard. See, e.g., Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(noting that class counsel was married to representative plaintiff); Susman v. 
Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that class counsel 
was named representative’s brother); Zlotnick v. TIE Commc’ns, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 
189, 193–94 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that class counsel was representative plaintiff’s 
son). Objector counsel should not be treated better than class counsel would be in 
this regard.    
143 See, e.g., DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 282 (W.D. Tex. 2007); 
Varacallo, 226 F.R.D. at 233.    
144 In addition to the cases cited supra note 137, J.P., for example, has seen his 
objections rebuffed in many other decisions. See, e.g., Taubenfeld v. AON Corp., 415 
F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that objections had been waived in district 
court and that objection to expense award “barely warrant[ed] comment”); In re 
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 467, 497 & n.219 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(citing other cases in which courts labeled J.P.’s objections “counterproductive” and 
“not well reasoned” (quoting In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 461 F. 
Supp. 2d 383, 386 (D. Md. 2006); Taubenfeld, 415 F.3d at 599)); Park v. Thomson 
Corp., 633 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009); In re AOL Time Warner 
ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv. 8853(SWK), 2007 WL 4225486, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 
2007) (finding that “several arguments” were “irrelevant or simply incorrect”); 
Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 2006 WL 4037549 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 29, 2006); Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513–14 (D. Del. 
2003). K.N., see supra note 136, has appeared in numerous insurance sales practices 
cases, often with the same objections, and has been repeatedly rebuffed. See, e.g., 
Benacquisto v. Am. Express Fin. Corp., No. 00-1980 (DSD/JMM), 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23914 (D. Minn. May 15, 2001); Michels v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 
No. 95/53181997 WL 1161145, at *5 & n.1 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. Jan. 3, 1997).   
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other valid objection to treating objector counsel like class 
counsel in this regard.145 
Among other things, this requirement would shed light on 
the validity of the time allegedly incurred by objector counsel.  If 
the same counsel made the same objection in prior cases, then 
little or no original work was required in the case at issue.  That 
absence of real effort should affect the fee award, if any, that 
could be made to objector counsel. 
Likewise, objecting class members themselves should 
provide a list of prior cases in which they have objected to 
settlements.  Such a requirement would to some extent parallel 
the mandate of the PSLRA that proposed lead plaintiffs identify 
other actions in which they have served as representative 
plaintiffs.146  Objections by clients who make a habit of asserting 
baseless objections to class action settlements should also be 
deemed presumptively invalid. 
Courts should even consider requiring objectors to submit to 
depositions by the settling parties, either in every case in which 
the settling parties wish to take such depositions or in particular 
circumstances only.  Class representatives are normally deposed 
before class certification.  Such questioning can bring to light 
how those representatives found their counsel and other facts 
that defendants believe might show that the putative 
representatives are not adequate.147  The settling parties often 
may have reason to believe that objectors have been recruited by 









145 At least one case imposed this requirement and rejected objectors’ arguments 
that it was unfair. DeHoyos, 240 F.R.D. at 316. 
146 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(v) (2006). A person may be a lead plaintiff in no 
more than five cases within three years absent leave of court. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
147 See, e.g., In re Monster Worldwide, Inc. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 132, 135–36 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Burkhalter Travel Agency v. MacFarms Intern., Inc., 141 F.R.D. 
144, 154 (N.D. Cal. 1991).  
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interests, rather than the other way around.148  Depositions of 
objectors may expose that fact, just as a deposition of a class 
representative may reveal inadequacy.149   
III. THE NEED TO TIGHTEN THE STANDARDS FOR FEE AWARDS TO 
OBJECTOR COUNSEL 
In addition to viewing more skeptically the objections 
presented by serial objector counsel, courts should tighten the 
standards for awarding fees to objector counsel.150  Though the 
 
148 See, e.g., Vollmer v. Publishers Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 
2001) (affirming denial of intervention but reversing sanctions against objector 
counsel where the district judge both denied intervention to objector and imposed 
sanctions on his professional objector counse and stating “that the attorneys 
recruited [their objector client] to intervene so that they could extract a fee from the 
proceedings”).  
149 For an excerpt of a deposition of a “know-nothing class representative,” see 
Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law 
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 437–38 (1999). Professor 
Mullenix asserts that the presence of such class representatives is “pervasive.” Id. at 
437. Whether or not that is so, objector clients are likely often utterly ignorant of the 
case and their role in it but are instead merely a convenient tool for the interests of 
professional objector counsel. See, e.g., supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text 
(discussing objections to class certification that go against the interest of objecting 
clients themselves).  
150 The arguments in this section relate, of course, only to objector counsel who 
appear on a contingent fee basis. Objector counsel whose clients have agreed to pay 
them on a different basis would be subject only to the normal rules that govern 
attorney fees. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2010). 
Noncontingent fees should be encouraged in the objector context, as they are the 
most rational and fair arrangement in many ways. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, 
objector counsel may be required to offer clients “an arrangement for compensation 
on the basis of the reasonable value of the services” before entering into a contingent 
arrangement. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7(b) (2010). First, an hourly or flat fee 
arrangement would resolve the conundrum identified by prominent scholars: Under 
the contingent fee regime, objector counsel are rewarded with a fee if they “improve” 
an inadequate settlement but not if they defeat it altogether. See, e.g., Coffee, supra 
note 22, at 423; Koniak & Cohen, supra note 43, at 1107 n.184. Second, replacing 
contingent fees with an alternative regime avoids the problem of disincentivizing 
class counsel by requiring them to share their fee with objector counsel, while still 
ensuring that objector counsel are paid. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying 
text. Third, particularly given the relatively limited scope of most objector legal 
work, which begins only after a settlement is reached and largely involves only the 
review of others’ efforts, it would be expected that an objector client who really 
believes that a settlement is unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate would find it in his 
or her economic interest to pay an appropriate, relatively small hourly or flat fee for 
counsel to vindicate that position. Objectors who must pay their counsel will 
consider whether it is objectively worthwhile to object, thereby reducing the number 
of groundless objections or those motivated by motives of extortion. In contrast, 
objectors who retain counsel on a contingent fee basis have no reason to evaluate 
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general principles of current law permit objector fee awards only 
in limited circumstances, enough exceptions have been made that 
serial objectors believe that they can earn a living by 
undermining class action settlements.  The courts should return 
to the strict rules that severely limit fee awards to objector 
counsel to cases in which their objections substantially benefit 
the class. 
Fee awards to class action objectors are “few and far 
between.”151  The general rule is that objectors are not entitled to 
fees.152  At least one case refers to this as a “presumption.”153  
Objectors are to be awarded fees only when they have “expended 
large amounts of time, money and resources, aided the court 
considerably in its consideration of proposed settlements and fee 
awards, and the class members were ultimately benefited as a 
result of the objectors’ efforts.”154  Even objector counsel whose 
 
whether an objection is rational, since they literally make no investment, financial 
or otherwise, in objecting and are thus indifferent to whether they are merely being 
used as the tools of professional objector counsel. Fourth, the decision of counsel to 
represent an objector will likewise be based on proper economic considerations 
rather than the potential to extort a portion of class counsel’s fees. It is not unheard 
of for objector counsel to act on a basis other than contingency. At oral argument in 
the Third Circuit on an objector appeal from the settlement approval in In re 
Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, No. 04-5184(GEB), 2007 WL 2589950 
(D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2007), appellate counsel for the objector told the court that he was 
working on an hourly basis. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 2589950.  
151 Spark v. MBNA Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (D. Del. 2003). 
152 In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 (W.D. Pa. 2003); In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 (D.N.J. 
2003). 
153 Martin v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., No. 3:06-CV-0878, 2008 WL 906472, 
at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2008). 
154 Spark, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (citing In re Harnischfeger Indust., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 212 F.R.D. 400, 413–15 (E.D. Wis. 2002); In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1214 (D.N.M. 1998)); see, e.g., Prudential, 273 F. 
Supp. 2d at 571 (noting that a  fee was awarded to objector counsel who added 
significant value even though “much of [that counsel’s] time was foolishly spent on 
parochial matters that did little to advance the progress of the litigation”); Shaw v. 
Toshiba Am. Info. Syst., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (noting that fees 
were awarded to certain objectors who conferred substantial benefit on class in the 
form of an extension of time to redeem coupons); Henry v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 
98-C-4110, 1999 WL 33526864, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1999) (awarding attorney 
fees, with consent of class counsel, for over 590 hours spent by objector who added 
three features to settlement, which according to plaintiffs’ experts were “very 
advantageous” to class,). Cases such as In re Riverstone Networks, Inc., 256 F. App’x 
168 (9th Cir. 2007), which awarded fees even while finding that the objector “raised 
objections similar to those already raised by another objector,” id. at 170, should not 
be followed. 
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efforts substantially benefit only a portion of the class can earn a 
fee.155  However, objector counsel should be required to submit 
specific proofs showing that their efforts substantially benefited 
the class and that the benefit would not have been achieved 
without their efforts.156 
More troubling, however, are awards to objectors who have 
not succeeded but merely “sharp[end the] focus” of the court by 
“transform[ing] the settlement hearing into a truly adversary 
proceeding.”157  Sharpening the focus or creating an adversarial 
atmosphere, separately or together, should never be a basis for a 
fee award.158  Those largely intangible and amorphous 
 
155 See, e.g., In re Visa Check/Master Money Antitrust Litig., No. CV-96-5238, 
2005 WL 2077286, at *13, *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2005) (awarding fee for causing 
addition of Spanish in claims process documents, which benefited only part of class); 
Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, L.P. v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, L.L.P., 
212 F.R.D. 400, 414 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (rejecting argument that entire class must 
benefit in order for objector counsel to get a fee award). 
156 For examples of cases applying this standard, see In re Cendant Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 200 (3d Cir. 2005); DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 
337 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
157 Frankenstein v. McCrory Corp., 425 F. Supp. 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
Frankenstein was among the first cases to adopt this idea, though the only case that 
Frankenstein cited as authority for doing so, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., No. 68 
Civ. 4026, 1976 WL 1264 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1976), expressly did not reach the issue 
of objector fees. Id. at *3. The “sharpening” concept appears to retain its greatest 
strength in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. 
Supp. 2d 297, 367–68 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Park v. Thomson Corp., 633 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D. 317, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Denney v. Deutsche 
Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 
2003 WL 22801724, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (awarding fee to objectors even 
though result would have been the same with or without them); see also In re AOL 
Time Warner ERISA Litig., No. 02 Cv. 8853(SWK), 2007 WL 4225486, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2007) (listing district court cases in Second Circuit that did or did 
not award objector fees merely for creating adversarial atmosphere). However, some 
cases elsewhere have also adopted this rationale. See, e.g., In re Domestic Air 
Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1993). But see Martin, 2008 
WL 906472, at *9–10 (noting that district courts in the Third Circuit do not follow 
the district courts in the Second Circuit that have awarded fees for “transforming 
the settlement hearing into a truly adversarial proceeding”). In In re Holocaust 
Victim Assets Litigation, the Second Circuit rejected an objector’s claim for fees for 
“sharpen[ing] the focus of settlement issues and provid[ing] important insights 
shaping the settlement.” 424 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2005). However, before finding 
that the objector had not reached that threshold, the court assumed, arguendo, that 
this standard was an accurate statement of the law. Id. To the extent that this 
foreshadows a retreat from the “sharpening” idea, it would be the appropriate path 
for the law to take.  
158 See Martin, 2008 WL 906472, at *9–10. 
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considerations do not benefit the class monetarily and are too 
easy to find, even in cases where no material sharpening 
occurred.159  Creating controversy should never justify a counsel 
fee.  Only substantial enhancement of the benefits to the class 
should give rise to a fee award.160  “Fee awards made on the basis 
of insignificant or cosmetic changes in the settlement serve to 
condone and encourage improper use of the objection process.”161 
In this regard, a comparison of objector counsel with class 
counsel is again useful.162  Class counsel are not compensated 
merely for raising important issues or creating an adversarial 
atmosphere.  If they do not create a benefit for the class, they do 
not receive a fee.  Sometimes class counsel do not get a fee even 
when they create such benefits, due to the vagaries of attorney 
fees law.163  It should not be easier for objector counsel to earn a 
fee than class counsel.164   
 
159 See, e.g., In re Synthroid Marketing Litig., 201 F. Supp. 2d 861, 882–83 (N.D. 
Ill. 2002) (denying an objector fee request when the “sharpened” issue was already 
“obvious”), aff’d in part, modified in part on other grounds, 325 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
160 See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2002); In re 
Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-03-05421 RMW, 2008 WL 5000208, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2008) (finding that even though objectors provided “some” 
benefit to class, it was not “substantial” and therefore did not warrant fee award); In 
re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 520 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Spark v. MBNA 
Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (D. Del. 2003); In re Great Neck Capital, 212 F.R.D. 
at 415 (awarding fees to objector lawyers who “contributed materially to the 
proceeding”); see also Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 
2006 WL 4037549, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (noting that while objectors 
“provided some value to the process, they [had] not demonstrated that their 
involvement significantly enhanced the settlement”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
Sales Practices Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 563, 572 (D.N.J. 2003) (reducing objector 
counsel fee request despite lack of objection to it because, despite “extensive” hours 
expended, the benefit to class from objections was “limited”). 
161 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 4.   
162 See id. (“So long as an objector is acting at least in part on behalf of the class, 
it is appropriate to impose on the objector a duty to the class similar to the duty 
assumed by a named class representative.”). 
163 For example, the United States Supreme Court abolished the “catalyst 
doctrine,” under which a plaintiff whose efforts are a catalyst for relief could obtain 
fees as a prevailing party under various federal statutes. Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). As a 
result, when a defendant “voluntarily” provides relief sought in a class action, while 
refusing to enter into a formal settlement, the defendant may be able to defeat a fee 
claim. This occurred in Chin v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 520 F. Supp. 2d 589 (D.N.J. 
2006), rev’d sub nom. Chin v. Chrysler LLC, 538 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008). There, the 
district court found that class counsel’s many years of effort led to an extension of 
automobile warranties and other relief worth millions of dollars to purchasers and 
lessees of Chrysler vehicles. Chin v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 461 F. Supp. 2d 279 
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Even in the rare circumstances where a fee to objector 
counsel could be justified, the fee should be no more than the 
objecting counsel’s lodestar, which is defined as the number of 
hours multiplied by the attorney’s reasonable rate.165  Unlike 
class counsel, who litigate for years while advancing huge 
amounts of out-of-pocket costs, objector counsel rarely, if ever, 
have real risk.166  Often, they merely parrot arguments raised 
more effectively by others167 or offer “suggestions” that the court 
 
(D.N.J. 2006). The district court then awarded class counsel an attorney fee for that 
success. Chin, 520 F. Supp. 2d 589. The Third Circuit reversed the fee award on 
choice of law grounds. Chin, 538 F.3d 272. Class counsel ended up with no fee at all, 
despite having obtained substantial relief for the class. 
164 Rule 23(h), which addresses fee awards, makes no distinction between class 
counsel and objector counsel in this regard. Rule 23(h) “does not undertake to create 
new grounds for an award of attorney fees or nontaxable costs.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) 
advisory committee’s note. Thus, the adoption of Rule 23(h) does not alter the 
previously enunciated standards for objector attorney fees. See Fleury v. Richemont 
North America Inc., No. C-05-4525-EMC, 2008 WL 4829868, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 
2008) (finding that Rule 23(h) does not create independent right to objector attorney 
fees and that the objector “must find an independent basis in substantive law 
authorizing such fees”). 
165 In many circumstances, plaintiff’s counsel who succeed in a contingent fee 
case can receive more than their lodestar. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 341 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that multipliers of 
between one and four on counsel's lodestar are frequently awarded) (citation 
omitted). But see Perdue v. Kenny A., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 176 L. Ed. 2d 
494 (2010) (limiting enhancements that are based on results achieved or quality of 
performance).  
166 See, e.g., UFCW Local 880 Joint Pension Fund v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 
05-cv-01046-MSK-BNB, 2008 WL 4452332, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2008). Many 
courts have refused to award a fee multiplier to objector counsel. See, e.g., In re 
Riverstone Networks, Inc., 256 F. App’x 168, 170 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying objector 
counsel’s request for fee multiplier because little or no risk incurred); Wininger v. SI 
Mgmt., L.P., 301 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 804 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 
631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Park v. Thomson Corp., 633 F. Supp. 2d 8, 
13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Perez v. Asurion Corp., No. 06-20734-CIV, 2007 WL 2591174, at 
*1 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2007) (rejecting demand for 3.5 multiplier for “risk and lost 
opportunity”); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig, 311 F. Supp. 2d 363, 381–82 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting risk argument), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2005); In re 
Elan Sec. Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d 363, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Homestore.com, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., No. CV01-11115 RSWL(CWX), 2004 WL 2792185, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
10, 2004); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., No. 00 Civ.6689 SAS, 2003 
WL 22801724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (rejecting multiplier requests). 
167 See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d at 157 (noting that 
others had made similar points more effectively and timely); Reynolds v. Beneficial 
Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 289 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that “objectors added nothing” 
since the subject of their objection was already presented to the court); Parker, 631 
F. Supp. 2d at 279 (awarding no fee for objectors whose submission came after, but 
“added nothing to, the substance of . . . a more effective objection” by others); UFCW 
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already had in mind.168  Merely “laudable” involvement, without 
“substantially enhanc[ing] the value of the settlement or 
benefit[ing] the class sufficiently [does not] warrant [the] award 
of attorneys’ fees.”169  Objector counsel “should not be rewarded 
simply because they joined the battle on the side that 
prevailed.”170 
A potential exception to the general rule that objectors 
should not receive fees may be institutional objectors.  Several 
courts have found that the input of institutional objectors had 
value.171  Congress directed that state attorneys general be 
notified of settlements and given the chance to opine on them.172  
 
Local 880, 2008 WL 4452332, at *4 (awarding no payment to serial objector who 
raised same objections that another objector did, in general form only, without 
meaningful analysis); Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 
2006 WL 4037549, at *3, *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006) (“[Objectors’] role was one of 
confirmation [of matters raised by others] not origination.”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 572, 593 n.50 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating 
objectors’ arguments were not novel and had been raised by state attorneys general), 
aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998). 
168 See, e.g., UFCW Local 880, 2008 WL 4452332, at *6 (awarding nominal 
payment for objector’s procedure suggestion because the court would have required 
the procedure on its own); Perez, 2007 WL 2591174, at *1 (awarding no fee for 
“suggestions” that court already incorporated into its oversight plan for the 
settlement). 
169 Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 2007 WL 425850, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2006). 
170 UFCW Local 880, 2008 WL 4452332, at *3. 
171 In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 311 F. Supp. 2d at 370–71 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that individual objector’s input was 
“belated” and “of no consequence” but that state Commissioner of Insurance’s timely 
submission on same subject had been helpful); In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
550 F. Supp. 2d 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (finding that individual objectors did 
“virtually nothing” but that institutional objectors had “play[ed] an important role in 
delineating the reasonableness of the fee award”). In In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare 
Corp. Securities Litigation, the court reduced class counsel’s fees by three percent 
and awarded that entire amount to counsel for objector state pension funds, who had 
“provided a useful, historical and comparative backdrop” for the court’s benefit. 3 F. 
Supp. 2d 1208, 1215 (D.N.M. 1998). The court emphasized the importance of input 
from institutional investors. Id. The fee award may have been an attempt to 
encourage institutional investors to take a more active role in securities class action 
litigation, as contemplated by the PSLRA. See id. at 1212 n.5 (noting that, though 
Congress had hoped to encourage involvement of institutional investors, objector 
institutions had declined to seek lead plaintiff position in this litigation). 
172 28 U.S.C. § 1715(a)–(b), (d) (2006). For an earlier argument that the “state is 
another potentially useful monitor of class action abuse,” see Brunet, supra note 7, 
at 410–11. Professor Brunet rightly observes, however, that such participants are 
“atypical” and that the prototypical objector is a class member represented by an 
“entrepreneurial” private attorney. Id. at 425. 
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In at least one recent case, a court found that such input from 
state attorneys general was persuasive in the court’s decision to 
disapprove a proposed settlement.173  Analogously, just as 
Congress intended for institutional investors to be favored in the 
context of appointment as lead plaintiffs in securities fraud 
cases,174 institutions may have a better claim to a counsel fee for 
a successful objection than do other objectors.  Institutions are 
less likely to become repeat objectors or to use the objection 
process as a means to make money for themselves or their 
counsel.  As a result, their objections may be more likely to be 
soundly reasoned.175 
Certain public interest organizations may qualify for 
different treatment as well, even though they are sometimes 
repeat objectors.176  Scholars have noted the legitimate 
contributions of such objectors.177  Unlike professional objector 
counsel, these public interest organizations are not motivated 
primarily by fees, even though such organizations are sometimes 
awarded fees where their efforts substantially benefit the class.178 
Finally, even if objectors are to be awarded fees, they should 
be able to claim them only when they submit detailed, 
contemporaneous time records supporting the time they claim.179  
 
173 Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 
2007). Attorney general objections are not always valid, however. In at least two 
recent cases, courts rejected objections by attorneys general. Dewey v. Volkswagen, 
No. 07-2240, 2010 WL 3018305, at *20–21 (D.N.J. July 30, 2010); Radosti v. 
Envision EMI, LLC, No. 09-887, 2010 WL 2292343, at *22  (D.D.C. June 8, 2010). 
174 See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 105, 170 and accompanying text.   
176 Such  organizations would not include those who are ideologically opposed to 
class actions or to the attorneys who bring them. The ulterior motive of such 
organizations disqualifies them from claiming that they are acting in the interest of 
class members rather than in their own selfish, even if nonmonetary, interests. 
177 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 7, at 456–63.   
178 See id. at 437 n.150 (defining “professional objectors” so as to exclude those 
“attorneys who sometimes are repeat players in the class action business who work 
for state attorneys general or public interest groups . . . [because they] are unlikely 
to be extortionists and particularly unlikely to withdraw an objection in exchange for 
a privately negotiated fee”). For cases awarding fees to objecting public interest 
organizations, see, for example, Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 102 F.3d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 
1996); Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 175, 176 (D. Mass. 
1998); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 359–60 (N.D. Ga. 
1993). 
179 Often, objector counsel submit only opaque summaries that do not permit 
meaningful review of their efforts. See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 551 
F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir.) (noting that objectors’ “fee applications . . . were barren of 
the detail required”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2767 (2008); Park v. Thomson Corp., 
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Though class counsel normally are not required to submit their 
own time records in cases in which their fee award is based on 
the percentage of the fund method,180 a key reason for that is the 
volume of information the court would have to review, given the 
length and breadth of class action matters.  In contrast, objector 
counsel surface very late in the process and have relatively little 
time invested in their objections.181  The court and class counsel, 
whose fee would be shared with objector counsel, would have no 
difficulty reviewing and analyzing such a limited amount of 
information.   
Again, to avoid deterring class counsel from taking on 
inherently risky class action litigation, courts should avoid 
reducing class counsel’s hard-earned fees by requiring that part 
of those payments be given to objector counsel.182  Requiring 
submission of time records would prevent extortionate fee 
applications by objector counsel.183  
CONCLUSION 
The vast majority of class action settlements are fair and 
reasonable results for the class.  The vast majority of the cases in 
which courts rejected settlements as unfair did so because those 
courts exercised their fiduciary duty to the class and carefully 
reviewed the proposed settlement, not because an objector 
enlightened the courts about something that the judges had not 
perceived.  Objectors and those who advocate for them have 
“vastly overstated the significance of the role they played” in 
those cases.184   
 
633 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (objector offered “no billing records or 
statement of time expended”); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 2003 
WL 22801724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003). 
180 See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 
342 (3d Cir. 1998). 
181 See, e.g., Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 785–86 (N.D. 
Ohio 2010); Park, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (“[Professional objector J.P.] did not appear 
in this action until three years [after the complaint was filed] and the time that he 
devoted to this matter spanned a far shorter interval [than that of class counsel].”). 
182 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (stating that generous fees 
are needed to give counsel incentive to bring risky, public interest-oriented cases).   
183 The concern that objector counsel will demand an excessive fee is not an 
academic one. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
184 Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. C-03-3359 SBA, 2006 WL 
4037549, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006); see also Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t 
Co., L.P., 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting the “immodesty” of 
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Courts have “a duty to the silent majority as well as the 
vocal minority.”185  That duty calls on courts to discourage 
objections that are made primarily to delay the delivery of 
settlement benefits to that “silent majority.”  Preventing 
objectors, particularly professional objector counsel, from 
extorting benefits for sitting by while class counsel worked hard, 
at great risk, to create the settlement benefits for the class is an 
additional benefit of restricting objections.  By refusing requests 
for objector counsel fees except when objectors present issues 
that the court would not otherwise already perceive and which 
substantially benefit class members, courts will reduce or even 
remove the scourge of extortionate and dilatory objections from 
the class action system, which would be a highly positive result 




objector counsel fee petition and stating that effect of that objection was “audacious” 
and “exaggerated to say the least”). 
185 In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 933 (8th Cir. 
2005). 
